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1 Introduction  
1.1 The Internet – a power struggle 
Through the evolution of technology, the character of communication has evolved into 
being analogous with international communication – a very large part of media texts are 
spread with complete disregard to national borders. This is, perhaps, not a complete 
novelty, as radio messages have been and are still only limited to the reach of radio 
signals rather than the borders from which they operate, but the limits of information 
spread on the Internet are not dependent on physical distances. Technologically, states 
have less means than ever to control that which is public, and this is something that 
even official state representatives admit openly.1 At the same time, the withering away 
of the nation-state is common to many theories of globalization, or as Bauman (1998, 
56) puts it, the nation-state is eroding and the eroding forces are transnational. In the 
sphere of communication, Appadurai (1990, 305) holds the view that ‘states find 
themselves pressed to stay “open” by the forces of media’ and both national and 
international media content ‘completely overwhelm and undermine the rhetoric of 
national politics’. New file-sharing technologies, such as peer-to-peer software, have 
created a situation where the spread of information and files cannot be stopped unless 
every single sent package is monitored or the Internet is closed down completely 
(Kullenberg, 2010, 45).  
Although the merits of these claims can be discussed, it is perhaps no surprise that such 
views and the technological evolution have created a great need for increased Internet 
governance, and especially new rules by which states may govern information online. 
The Internet’s decentralized structure and lack of transparency means that the Internet is 
a great tool for undermining oppressive powers. Although the Internet’s infrastructure 
gives tools for democracy it does, at the same time, raise security concerns. Maintaining 
a balance between the security of states and their nationals and the right to private life of 
individuals is therefore of great importance. 
Bearing in mind that the Internet is a global phenomenon, the legal framework has 
usually been limited to a country’s national borders. Within the EU, however, certain 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Hillary Clinton’s (2010) speech Remarks on Internet Freedom.  
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communication laws are common for all members of the union – many of these laws 
which, in essence, affect Internet governance in one way or another. Essentially, there 
are some common governance principles for all of the member states, implying that the 
expanding of governance or limiting of citizen’s rights and freedoms should be almost 
identical throughout the union, or at least represent a common lowest denominator. 
Since European law is superior to the national laws of its members (Europa.eu, 2011), 
this also means that any decisions made on Internet governance on the EU level will 
affect all member states. This does not mean, however, that once the rules are in place, 
there will be no issues regarding the interpretation and national implementation of said 
legislation. It is for this reason that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) determine the way these rules are applied in 
practice, as they ultimately decide how these rules should be interpreted (in other words, 
they have the res interpretata).  
Although the courts have the authority to interpret European legislation, the European 
Commission plays an important part as it initiates legislation and drafts laws. This 
means that the Commission determines, to a great extent, what legislative path the EU 
takes. Naturally, there are several directives initiated by the Commission, which, in one 
way or another, affect Internet governance. What I want to research is how the 
Commission takes diverging interests into account when it drafts legislation on Internet 
governance, and whether or not a particular bias towards certain interests can be found 
or if a balanced approach is actually achieved. 
I base my theoretical viewpoint partly on Martti Koskenniemi’s theory of international 
law, according to which international law is always indeterminate – the international 
legal system is made out of several legal regimes, which makes it possible to look at 
issues from several different perspectives. According to his theory, however, institutions 
still prefer some legal regimes or rules over others, and this dictates to a large extent 
how a certain issue will be looked at, something he calls an institution’s structural bias. 
(Koskenniemi, 2005, 513-15, 606-7). What is essential in the particular case of the 
Internet is that the its governance principles may be guided by a trade perspective, a 
data security perspective, a privacy perspective, a national security perspective, or a 
human rights perspective and so on. According to Koskenniemi, the choice of a 
particular legal regime is subject to what an institution sees as its mission. This is 
especially interesting when it comes to the European Commission, as it is drafts 
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directives on a very wide range of issues, which makes it difficult to define the 
Commission’s structural bias from the outset. It remains to be seen if certain 
perspectives have been more dominant when the Commission has drafted directives on 
issues related to the Internet. 
In other words, whose rights and/or freedoms is the Commission trying to protect with 
the legislation it drafts? More specifically, I am interested in how these directives have 
affected the rights and freedoms of citizens, which in the end will give an indication of 
the status of the individual in terms of Internet-related rights vis-à-vis the rights of 
corporations and nation states within the European Union.  To frame the question 
differently, there seems to be a fundamental conflict of definitions in terms of what 
constitutes ‘the public interest’ online. This study aims to clarify the view of the 
Commission and analyze to what extent the Commission’s approach has changed 
throughout the years (if at all). 
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1.2 Key terminology  
To clarify the subject matter I will present key terminology which is essential for 
understanding the issue at hand. Most of the terms presented below are part of greater 
concepts and theories and will be presented more thoroughly in the theoretical 
discussion. 
Internet governance can be divided into two strands. First, Internet governance can be 
focused on technical issues, such as the administration of IP addresses and the domain 
name system (DNS). The primary actor in this respect is ICANN, the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, which is a ‘not-for-profit public-benefit 
corporation with participants from all over the world dedicated to keeping the Internet 
secure, stable and interoperable’ (ICANN, 2011). Second, Internet governance can be 
associated with power structures, content-related issues and the political aspects of 
Internet legislation. However, as the Internet’s infrastructure allows wide, decentralized 
content dissemination, the technical aspects of Internet governance cannot be 
completely ignored. This is expressed clearly in the WSIS (World Summit on the 
Information Society) documents, which brings issues such as the digital divide, Internet 
infrastructure, domain name allocation and cybercrime under the same umbrella (WSIS, 
2005).  Governance is, however, an elusive concept and it will be presented more 
thoroughly in my presentation of the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
Data protection was initially primarily concerned with customer and patient databases 
but with the emergence of new information society services and service providers, the 
data protection provisions have been revised and updated to also address issues such as 
data tracking of users’ Internet use. One of the fastest-growing online markets is 
targeted advertising, which to a large extent relies on Internet companies collecting 
detailed information on the people that use their services. As many of the most 
dominant Information and Communications Technology (ICT) service providers are 
situated in the US there have been some concerns regarding the American companies’ 
use of consumer data and their practices compatibility with European legislation – US 
data protection laws are less strict than their European counterparts.2 
                                                 
2 The Patriot Act, enacted shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, is a good example. The act has made it 
much easier for US agencies to monitor digital communications and records without needing a court 
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Data retention refers to the principles that govern the archival and release of 
telecommunication data. The data collected is restricted to traffic data, not content, but 
as will be shown below, the retention of traffic data heavily affects the privacy of users. 
In the European Union these principles are stipulated in the EU Data Retention 
Directive, which all EU member states have had to adopt into their national legislation. 
In practice this means that not only the storing of data must be done according to the 
same standards throughout the Union but the permissible means of access are also 
clearly defined. The Data Retention Directive covers both telephony and Internet 
services, which means that not only call data is processed, but also to whom users send 
emails, for example. As wireless Internet on mobile devices is becoming increasingly 
common and more difficult to separate from other telecommunications services (IP 
telephony is a good example), it is highly probable that the different rules between 
Internet-based services and traditional telecommunications are likely to disappear over 
time. Today there are, however, some differences, which will be presented at a later 
stage. 
In this thesis, illegal file-sharing refers to copyright infringement of intellectual 
property rights in an online environment. In this instance copyright infringement will 
not include the unauthorized manufacturing or selling of goods but rather the illegal 
copying and distribution of software and media online. It is not to be confused with 
piracy (although file-sharing is often called Internet piracy), which is defined as ‘the 
unauthorized recording, copying, or broadcasting of any article the subjection matter of 
intellectual property protect, on a commercial scale and for profit’ (Agarwal, 2010, 801, 
emphasis added). 
File-sharing differs from other copyright infringement in the sense that the goal is not 
financial gain but rather the free distribution of copyrighted content. Therefore the 
content originators do not suffer from a factual financial loss but rather a hypothetical 
financial loss stemming from the possibility of decreased sales, due to the fact that the 
content is available for free. Similarly, the “Internet pirates”, as distributors of 
                                                                                                                                               
order.  Although the act was enacted to combat terrorism and protect national security, warrant statistics 
shows that the act has been used mainly for other purposes, such as drug enforcement. See Benjamin 
Wallace-Wells (2011) article in New York magazine for a more detailed evaluation of the impact of the 
Patriot Act. 
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copyrighted material are commonly named, do not gain financially, but rather benefit 
from not having to spend money on the audio-visual products they covet. Piracy must 
not be confused with theft as the original copy is left untouched. 
The concept structural bias refers to the disposition of courts to make decisions that 
favour a particular type of actors and/or ideology. The concept is a central argument in 
Martti Koskenniemi’s (2005) book From Apology to Utopia, which analyzes the 
functioning of the international legal system and the structure of the international legal 
argument. I will attempt to apply this concept on the European level, bearing in mind 
that European law represents a special international legal regime. I will present this 
concept more thoroughly in chapter three.  
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1.3 Research question and hypothesis 
As stated in the introduction I am interested in how the drafts the Commission proposes 
to the Council and the Parliament reflect different views on Internet governance. Since 
these drafts shape the actual directives, which are subsequently made binding for all the 
member states of the union, the way the Commission sees Internet governance greatly 
influences the public interest, which might mean the citizen’s rights to private life and 
communication and freedom of expression in the long run.  
How does the European Commission see the balance of rights between interests of 
national security, economic interests and protection of the rights of individuals, namely 
the data protection of European citizens and their freedom of expression? In what way 
does the Commission affect or try to influence this balance through legislative measure? 
In order to get answers to these questions, I will also need to provide an oversight of 
potential stakeholders and their interests. My aim is to use previous research to be able 
to pinpoint these stakeholders and their interests to better understand the underlying 
factors affecting the Commission’s decision making.  
My main research question is thus the following: 
‐ How is Internet governance shaped by the European Commission, and how 
is the balance between economic interests and public interest represented in 
the agreements and proposals for directives the Commission has drafted? 
To answer this question I will need to ask the following sub-questions as well: 
‐ What are the primary concerns of the parties who have criticized the 
Commission’s draft directives or agreements? 
‐ Bearing in mind that the Commission’s fundamental mission is to create and 
facilitate the Single Market, what political means are available for actors 
aiming at strengthening areas of the public interest which are not economic 
in nature, such as fundamental rights and freedoms? 
‐ Which Commission Department (Directorate-General) had the primary 
drafting responsibility? 
‐ If the Commission fails to strike a balance of interests with its draft 
directives, which interested parties are then affected and how? 
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My hypothesis is that certain stakeholders benefit from the Commission’s actions more 
than others, and that the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms are affected negatively. The 
reason why I am inclined to believe this is that prior to the Lisbon Treaty, which was 
adopted in 2007, the Commission submitted drafts to be approved by the Council and 
the Parliament under the First Pillar of the European Union, which is concerned with 
policies related to creating a single market. Any proposals under the First Pillar must 
take financial interests into consideration, but laws pertaining to Internet governance 
ultimately affect the right to private life and communication.  
The ambivalence of the Internet legislation can also be seen in the light of what 
constitutes the public interest in the European Union. No explicit definition exists of the 
public interest (or general interest, as it is also commonly referred to in Europe), which 
means that the term inherently contains a conflict between what constitutes as the public 
interest from an economic perspective and what constitutes the public interest from a 
citizen’s point of view, when they overlap and when they two are fundamentally 
disparate. It is doubtful whether the Commission takes these rights of citizens into 
sufficient consideration. The reasons behind proposing certain drafts might not be 
purely economic however, as is the case with the EU Data Retention Directive. One of 
the main reasons the Directive was initiated was the fear of terrorism (Bignami, 2007, 
234-38). In other words, concerns of national security might be just as central as 
economic interests when it comes to Internet governance. Few directives seem, 
however, to have been initiated with the sole aim of protecting fundamental rights and 
freedoms. 
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1.4 Research material and method 
The methodological approach falls between policy analysis and analysis of legal 
processes. The draft directives are carefully drafted documents, in other words a 
concrete product of policies that the Commission has adopted at an earlier stage 
(through Green Papers, for example). The proposal for a Directive is the first formal 
step in the law-making process, after which the Parliament and the Council and various 
other parties have the chance to comment and amend the proposal. I will not look at the 
other law-drafting steps. Ideally, the Commission should have taken industry and civil 
society interests into account before a proposal is drafted.   
I will analyze the proposals which preceded the following directives: the Directive on 
Electronic Commerce (Directive 2000/31/EC), the ePrivacy Directive (Directive 
2002/58/EC), the IPR Enforcement Directive (Directive 2004/48/EC) as well as the 
proposal for a second IPR Enforcement Directive and the EU Data Retention Directive 
(Directive 2006/24/EC). The Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/45/EC) and the 
Copyright Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC) are excluded from this study as they do not 
aim to address questions related to the Internet specifically, while the later directives, 
the ePrivacy Directive and the IPR Enforcement Directive were specifically drafted to 
tackle questions that the Internet had created.3  
The first Directive is concerned with the storage and accessibility of 
telecommunications data, the two following are concerned with data protection and 
online commercial activities and the remaining three directives are related to intellectual 
property rights. I will also analyze the controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, an international agreement on copyright and intellectual property rights that 
the Commission negotiated with other WTO member states, which was ultimately 
rejected by the Parliament. 
 
 
 	
                                                 
3 The directives clearly affect Internet governance however, and references will be made to the directives 
throughout this thesis, although they are not included in the analysis. 
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2 The EU and Internet governance 
2.1 The European Commission 
To better understand why the Commission might be fail in its mission to balance 
different interests and what consequences that bias might have, I will continue to 
explain the basic functions of the Commission which are relevant for the purpose of this 
thesis. 
The European Commission is the executive power of the European Union, and it is also 
vested with the power to propose legislation. The Commission is composed of 27 
commissioners from each EU country. Although all member states are represented, the 
commissioners do not represent their home countries per se. The President of the 
Commission is nominated by the European Council, and the Council also appoints the 
other commissioners in agreement with the nominated President (Europa.eu, 2011b).  
The European Parliament has to approve all the commissioners, and the Parliament also 
has the power to dismiss the Commission. The current president is José Manuel 
Barroso. 
The Commission is elected for 5 years and each commissioner is assigned a specific 
policy area by the President (Europa.eu, 2011b).  During the present period (2010-2014) 
Vice-President Neelie Krous’s core policy area is the “digital agenda” (European 
Commission, 2011a). It can be argued that Krous’s opinions will reflect the 
Commission’s opinion as a whole when it comes to Internet governance, and I will 
therefore use her statements to support my analysis. As can be deduced from her tweets 
(@NatalieKrousEU) the Vice-President seems to have taken a special interest in 
copyright. In a recent blog post Krous (2001a) pondered on the effects of copyright 
legislation and if copyrights should be ‘[a] tool to recognise and reward artists ... [o]r a 
tool to punish and withhold material?’ arriving at the first conclusion, but regretting that 
the second answer seems to be the more common one in the digital age.  Although the 
viewpoint is just a popularized generalization of the issue, it still shows Krous’s positive 
disposition towards copyright. It remains to be seen if that positive disposition also 
affects the Vice-President’s view on copyright enforcement. 
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The purpose of the Commission is to oversee and implement EU policies by 1) 
proposing new laws to the Parliament and the Council, 2) managing the EU’s budget 
and allocating funding 3) enforcing EU law (together with the ECJ) and 4) representing 
the EU internationally (Europa.eu, 2011b). In my thesis I will only focus on the first 
category, namely the proposition of laws: the Commission has the right to propose new 
laws ‘to protect the interests of the EU and its citizens’ (Europa.eu, 2011b). Under the 
principle of subsidiarity, the Commission can only use its powers insofar as the 
objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states (Temple Lang, 2006, 
128). In other words, the motivation behind enacting legislation must be rooted in a 
need to harmonize legislation in the EU. Whether or not an issue should be addressed 
on a national or European level is a political question, however. 
During the last ten years the European Union has evolved from an economic community 
to a political union. This means that in addition to the First Pillar of the European 
Community, which is focused on economic affairs, the Maastricht treaty, which entered 
into force in 1993, included a Second Pillar which accounts for security and foreign 
policy, and a Third Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs (Temple Lang, 2006, 127). The 
reason why this matters is that the First Pillar represents the so-called “Community 
method” where the Commission, as a supranational organization, has the power to 
prepare Community policies. The proposed legislation is then approved by the 
Parliament and the Council with qualified majority decision-making (Dehousse, 2003). 
The second and third intergovernmental pillars in the areas of foreign policy, justice and 
internal affairs, required a different legislative process. Proposals made under the 
Second or Third Pillar could be made by single member states, but had to be 
unanimously accepted by the Council (Bignami, 2007, 239). In some cases it was 
simply more convenient to enact legislation under a particular pillar, as was the case 
with the Data Retention Directive. 
Since the Lisbon Treaty (effective as of 2009) the pillars have been joined and the EU 
has only one legal personality, which means that legislation is passed according to the 
“ordinary legislation procedure” where the Commission proposes a law and the Council 
and the Parliament approve it through co-decision (TFEU, article 294, introduced by 
Lisbon). This means that the Parliament’s position in the law-making process has been 
strengthened. The Commission cannot make proposals for legislation on a common 
security and foreign policy, however. Although the process has changed since when the 
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directives that will be analyzed were approved, the influence of the Commission on 
European legislation is still of fundamental importance. Even if the passed legislation 
might to some extent be different from the Commission’s initial draft, the draft still sets 
the agenda for the discussions in the Parliament and the Council.   
The Commission is not a unitary actor, however, as is exemplified by the 33 
Departments or Directorates-Generals (DGs) that are responsible for specific policy 
areas and the drafting of proposals for Directives within those areas. Although the 
names of the DGs have changed during the years, this thesis is primarily concerned with 
the DG for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG Connect) and DG 
Internal Market and Services (DG MARKT), which were previously called DG 
Information Society and Media and DG XV, respectively. According to Dehousse 
(2003, 22), ‘[a]s a rule, issue cutting across several policy areas will be dominated by 
the most homogenous community of experts.’ What this means is that a dominant DG 
which moves on a policy area first will be able to set the agenda, even though the 
agenda might span over several policy sectors. Internet governance issues clearly span 
several policy sectors, and different DGs are highly likely to frame the issues differently 
and ultimately draft Proposals for directives from completely different outsets.  
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2.2 Previous research  
2.2.1 E-commerce, data protection and data retention  
The difficulty in finding previous research on the matter is that these directives and the 
directives’ law-making processes are usually examined separately. Most research on the 
directives related to Internet governance has been conducted by lawyers, and the central 
question in those studies is usually whether the new Directive is compatible with 
existing EU legislation.  
For the purpose of this thesis, however, it is important to treat the directives as part of a 
common framework, although the directives might, at first sight, be seen as belonging 
to different legislative frameworks. To be able to determine what effects the struggle of 
interests has on the Commission’s Proposals it is necessary to connect the dots and see 
the big picture. I will present the research on the directives mentioned above, without 
delving into whether they are compatible with previous EU law or national legislation. 
The focus will lie in presenting the concerns other researchers have elevated when they 
have studied the directives, which also support me in my analysis of the documents. 
One of the first directives that was related directly to the Internet was the e-Commerce 
Directive. As the name indicates, it is primarily interested in economic aspects, and its 
goal was to promote cross-national trade within the single market (Livolsi, 2001, 473). 
The scope of the Directive is quite wide, as it covers all commercial communications: 
newspapers, online databases, online professional services, advertisement, services 
funded by either advertisement or sponsorship, online stores, entertainment services, 
product placement, public relation activities and so on (Livolsi, 2001, 475; Lehmann 
2001, 105-6). Essentially, this means that almost all online activities are covered by the 
Directive. Noll (2002, 212-14) elevates the Commission’s attempts to increase self-
regulation of the Internet by endorsing codes of conduct, trustmarks, seals and logos. 
The purpose of self-regulation is two-fold. First, it attempts to boost consumer 
confidence in online businesses. Second, it attempts to increase businesses’ compliance 
with the European Community’s legislation on e-commerce.   
Although most would agree that the Directive increased consumer protection and 
consumer confidence (Lehmann, 2001; Noll, 2002), the Directive’s liability provisions 
have been criticized. According to article 15 all third party Information Society service 
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providers are exempt from liability, which means that they are not obligated to devote 
attention to the content which passes through their networks. Similarly, hosting 
providers are exempt from liability according to article 14 as long as they are unaware 
of the illegal activity happening on their servers – in other words, Facebook is not 
responsible for the users’ actions on the social network. If notified of illegal activity, 
however, the service provider must act swiftly. Lehmann (2001, 111) criticizes these 
provisions on the note that ‘it appears somewhat unreasonable for the service provider 
of a BBS [Bulletin Board Service] system on the Internet to be governed by more 
lenient liability rules than would any traditional publisher’. Lehmann (2001, 112-13) 
sees the exemption of liability as especially problematic in questions of intellectual 
property rights, and maintains that the Directive is not compatible with the TRIPS 
(Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement. Others have noted 
that for Internet Service Provuders (ISPs) to be willing to guarantee the free flow of 
information, they must also be exempt from liability – essentially, the functioning of the 
Internet is safeguarded by ensuring that ISPs can conduct their business without threat 
of lawsuits (Van Eecke & Ooms, 2007, 3). Van Eecke and Ooms (2007, 6-7) note, 
however, that in practice national courts have issued injunctions that require third party 
service providers to monitor content. 
The other side of the spectrum is represented by the Data Protection Directive and 
ePrivacy Directive, which aim to limit how communication data are stored. It may be 
noted, however, that one purpose of the Data Protection Directive was to establish a 
legal framework for providing free and secure movement of personal data across the 
borders of the EU member states. Löfgren and Webster (2009, 283) explain that as the 
purpose of the Data Protection Directive is to both secure a commercial market for data 
processing and secure the protection of personal data, there is some uncertainty as to 
whether these twin goals are compatible from the outset. Although the ePrivacy to a 
large extent repeats the provisions in the Data Protection Directive, it provided more 
detailed information on exactly how data may be stored in the new online environment, 
such as the processing of location data when providing services, how consumers can be 
approached with commercial emails and process cookies in general. The ePrivacy 
Directive requires a website operator to inform visitors that user data is being 
downloaded onto their servers, and that visitors should be given the right to refuse 
websites to download cookies onto their computers (Jones & Tahri, 2011, 634). Tahri 
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and Jones (2011, 635) note, however, that it is difficult for website offers to identify and 
keep track of users who have consented to the use of cookies, since few technical 
solutions are available. 
The Data Retention Directive has not yet been extensively researched because of its 
relatively young age. As the Directive was adopted in March 2006 there have been a 
number of legal articles written on the subject, but few studies have been conducted in 
the sphere of political science and communication research.  It is important to note that 
the Directive is only concerned with the storage (retention) of traffic data and not 
content data. 
In 2007, Bignami (2007, 249) set out to study whether the right to privacy was 
adequately protected under the Data Retention Directive. After presenting the legislative 
procedure, Bignami concluded that privacy is satisfactorily protected under the 
Directive.  She came to this conclusion after examining a) the type of law and b) the 
measure’s proportionality (Bignami, 2007, 250). When examining the type of law she 
stated that the law was accessible, detailed and democratically enacted. The European 
Parliament had co-decision powers in deciding whether or not the Directive was to be 
adopted or not, which ultimately also made the discussions more transparent and a 
larger burden of justification was required (Bignami, 2007, 250-51). Furthermore, the 
Data Protection Working Party, which is composed of national data protection officials, 
and the European Data Protection Supervisor were consulted in the law-making process 
(Bignami, 2007, 240-41).  
Bignami determines that the Directive is proportionate because of two primary reasons. 
First, the Council concluded that routine law enforcement methods, as opposed to 
privacy-invading retention of communications data, would suffice for ordinary crimes 
like theft (Bignami, 2007, 250). On this basis it was decided that data that had been 
retained by the telecommunications providers could only be used in investigations of 
serious crimes (Bignami, 2007, 252). A more detailed specification of what those 
serious crimes might be was not, however, included. Second, Bignami (2007, 251) 
withholds that the maximum retention period of two years is reasonable: ‘It takes time 
to plan certain types of crimes, and it is not unthinkable that, even two years before the 
event, the conspiracy might have begun to take shape and leave communications traces.’ 
The Working Party and the Data Protection Supervisor opposed this view, however, and 
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remained sceptical that communications data over six months old could be useful in 
investigating crimes (Bignami, 2007, 247). Furthermore, Bignami states that the amount 
of personal (traffic) data retained seems reasonable. 
Not all academics agree with Bignami. Feiler (2010) raises several issues with the Data 
Retention Directive.  First, the Directive does not set any limits on the conditions of 
access to retained data (Feiler, 2010, 7).  The European Community had no power to 
regulate the issue of access by national authorities, although the issues themselves have 
been broadly limited to processing operations concerning public security, defence and 
the activities of the state in areas of criminal law (ibid.). Feiler (2010, 7, 16-17) also 
points out that the purpose of the use of the retained data which is the ‘investigation, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime’ means that the Directive is a blanket 
measure, as retained data can be used to find suspicious behaviour by analyzing 
everybody’s communication patterns. 
Feiler (2010, 17) underlines that ‘[a]ny effort to “detect” very rare but vaguely defined 
behaviour within an entire population – like “terroristic activities” – raises particularly 
grave concerns’. Traffic data analysis can also tell more about persons than one might 
think – analyzing, for example, to whom someone has sent email messages can tell a 
great deal about a person’s sexual orientation, political affiliation and medical condition 
(Feiler, 2010, 20). Since the Data Retention Directive also means that the location of 
phone calls is retained, a map can be construed of a person’s whereabouts during a 
period of two whole years. Bearing in mind that no adequate measures to combat abuse 
by national authorities or third parties exist, so-called data mining would allow for a 
continuous surveillance of the entire population (Feiler, 2010, 20).  
Lastly, it is worth noting that for people who wish to avoid being caught in the retention 
net, there are numerous ways to circumvent it. According to the Directive, the only 
online communications that are retained are ‘Internet email’ and ‘Internet telephony,’ 
which essentially excludes blogs, message boards, video platforms, social media 
platforms, instant messaging, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) in general and peer-
to-peer services (Feiler, 2010, 13). According to Feiler (2010, 20), ‘[t]his limited 
effectiveness reduces the public purpose that has to be weighed against the individual's 
interest of non-interference with his or her right to privacy.’ In other words, those who 
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the Directive aims to catch are probably the ones who have the easiest time avoiding 
retention, while those who have no reason to do so are tracked constantly. 
Another concern for data protection related to the Data Retention Directive was that the 
data which was collected within commercial activities could be accessed by law 
enforcement authorities for public security reasons. The problem with this was that the 
Data Protection Directive only extended to First Pillar activities, which means that 
although the data are the same, the protection offered by the European legal system is 
different (Kosta et. al, 2007, 349-50). As noted above, the Lisbon treaty removed the 
three pillar structure. In principle, this allows European institutions to carry out a more 
unitary policy to protect personal data, but the Data Protection Directive would have to 
be amended to include areas from the former second and third pillars, such as 
combating terrorism, common foreign and security policy and police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters (Nino, 2010, 69). 
2.2.2 Copyright enforcement 
Although the e-Commerce Directive did cover all commercial communications online 
and touched upon the subject of copyright infringement, in terms of copyright 
enforcement, the most important European Directive is the Intellectual Property 
Rights Enforcement Directive (hereinafter IPRED1), which addresses the problem of 
piracy and counterfeiting in the EU and tries to harmonize intellectual property 
legislation in the member states (Agarwal, 2010, 797). IPRED1 has been criticized for 
being overly broad in its scope as it applies to ‘any infringement of intellectual property 
rights’ and that it fails to distinguish between measures to be taken in cases of 
commercial scale infringement and unintentional non-commercial infringement 
(Agarwal, 2010, 798). In layman’s terms this means that the Directive fails to 
distinguish between corporations producing illegal copies of products, such as fake bags 
and clothing, and consumers engaging in minor copyright infringing activities such as 
copying CDs and DVDs for their friends or private use. IPRED1 does not provide any 
sanctions, however, as the member states were of the opinion that the Commission’s 
proposal to include sanctions was inappropriate for a single market measure intended to 
encourage the free movement of goods (Agarwal, 2010, 798).  
Despite IPRED1, the Commission felt that supplementary legislation was needed to 
harmonize a set of penalties applicable throughout the community, and in 2005, the 
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European Commission proposed a Second Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement 
Directive (hereinafter IPRED2) (Agarwal, 2010, 808). Agarwal’s research was mostly 
interested in examining whether or not IPRED2 is actually needed or if the present 
regulation can be updated to better suit the needs of the EU. In the process of examining 
the need for IPRED2, Agarwal (2010, 810) also points out that ‘by not specifying the 
extent to which an alleged infringer must reap a commercial advantage for the term 
“commercial scale” to apply, consumers could face criminal sanctions for acts such as 
downloading music or movies.’ In addition to the actual proposal, the Commission has 
also drafted Green papers on the subject. The papers discuss, for example, the following 
possibilities to combat counterfeiting and piracy: monitoring by the private sector, use 
of technical devices, sanctions and other methods of enforcing intellectual property 
rights and cooperation between competent authorities (Agarwal, 2010, 804-5). This 
means giving the intellectual property right holders the role of actually monitoring 
communication activities to trace back the sources of illegal usage of products and 
services (Agarwal, 2010, 805). 
One of the more criticized measures used for deterring copyright infringement is the so-
called graduated response mechanism. Graduated response essentially means increased 
cooperation between rights holders and Internet service providers. In practice, this 
means that rights holders identify a copyright infringement, inform the Internet service 
provider, which on the basis of this data identifies the infringer by the IP address.4 The 
ISP then issues a warning to the alleged infringer. If the infringement continues, the ISP 
issues yet another warning. If the infringer is caught a third time the infringer is 
sanctioned, usually by termination of Internet subscription. This is why graduated 
response has also been called the “three strikes policy.” Although not officially 
supported by EU institutions, France, the UK and Ireland have chosen to implement the 
policy. The policies in the countries differ slightly in terms of mechanisms and 
sanctions, but essentially, they are the same. 
 In Ireland, for example, the three strikes policy concerns only one ISP, Eircom, and the 
legality of the agreement has also been debated in the Irish High Court, where the 
practice was judged lawful by Mr Justice Charleton (Nagle, 2010, 309). Nagle (2010, 
                                                 
4 Every Internet connection has a unique Internet Protocol (IP) address. Some ISPs provide dynamic IP 
addresses, however, which means that the subscriber’s IP address changes from time to time. 
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312) interpreted Charleton J’s decision as being rooted in his interpretation of the 
Internet: ‘In deciding in this manner, Charleton J perhaps sees access to the Internet 
more as “privilege” rather than “fundamental human right” and he rejects and that the 
enforcement of copyright through policies such as “three strikes” constitutes an invasion 
of privacy and the right to freedom of expression, even the right to freely contract.’ 
Furthermore, Nagle wondered what would happen if all Irish ISPs implemented the 
policy, and infringers would have their subscriptions terminated by every ISP. Would 
the infringers then argue that ‘the music industry does not have a right to define the 
parameters of their digital freedom or their rights to access the Internet, to privacy and 
their rights to express themselves and to receive information?’ (Nagle, 2010, 316).  
In France a government agency, HADOPI (Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des 
Œuvres et la Protection des Droits sur Internet), identifies the infringer instead of the 
ISP, but ISPs submit the IP address information to HADOPI. If the infringement 
continues the account holder may even be sanctioned through a simplified legal 
procedure (Meyer & Van Audenhove, 2010, 74). The sanctions provided by law are a 
fine, suspension of Internet access up to one year and even imprisonment. The main 
difference between the Irish and the French policies is the level of government 
involvement, but also that ISPs are basically not involved in the process, which means 
that all ISPs are required to deny an infringer Internet subscription. On the other hand, 
suspension of Internet access can only be sanctioned after a legal procedure, which is 
not the case in Ireland. 
The British graduated response mechanism relies heavily on rights holder and service 
provider cooperation, or as Meyer and Van Audenhove (2010, 75) call it, “industrial 
activism.” According to the Digital Economy Act, ISPs can also be forced to provide a 
copyright infringement list of repeat infringers to rights holders that enable rights 
holders to start legal proceedings against the account holders (Meyer & Van 
Audenhove, 2010, 75). The identity of the account holder is, however, not disclosed.  
Furthermore, with the approval of the Parliament, the Secretary of State of the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills may direct OFCOM5 to oblige ISPs to 
                                                 
5 Office of Communications. The independent regulator and competition authority for the UK 
communications industries. OFCOM is a corporate body created by statute. See the Office of 
Communications Act (2002).  
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limit or suspend Internet access of the account holder (Meyer & Van Audenhove, 2010, 
75).  
The European Parliament, on the other hand, has shown its disapproval of graduated 
response on multiple occasions (Meyer & Van Audenhove, 2010, 74). Nagle (2010, 
316), Meyer and Van Audenhove (2010, 70-71) all express concerns for the usage of 
technology to combat copyright infringement. They elevate that scanning can fail to 
distinguish between legal and illegal use of copyrighted content. Furthermore, the 
graduated response mechanism is based on so-called closed code, which means that the 
monitoring and detection of infringement, is not subject to public scrutiny regardless of 
whether the activities are conducted by a private or public entity (Meyer & Van 
Audenhove, 2010, 77).  
First, this means that there is little awareness of on what foundations infringers are 
found guilty of copyright infringement. Second, the identification of the infringement is 
conducted by rights holders who have an economic incentive to find as many infringers 
as possible. Third, the focus lies in creating an enforcement climate rather than 
developing legal services that would surpass illegal alternatives. Meyer and Van 
Audenhove (2010, 76) assert that ‘the current discourse on online piracy portrays rights 
holders as residing in a state of emergency, requiring exception measures such as 
graduated response and steadily avoids discussions on alternative forms of remuneration 
that could disturb the status quo of (big) rights holders.’ 
Concerns of the effects of the three strikes policy have also been expressed by Peter 
Hustinx (2010, para. 17), the European Data Protection Supervisor: 
‘Such practices are highly invasive in the individuals’ private sphere. They 
entail the generalised monitoring of Internet users’ activities, including 
perfectly lawful ones. They affect millions of law-abiding Internet users, 
including many children and adolescents. They are carried out by private 
parties, not by law enforcement authorities. Moreover, nowadays, the Internet 
plays a central role in almost all aspects of modern life, thus, the effects of 
disconnecting Internet access may be enormous, cutting individuals off from 
work, culture, eGoverment applications, etc.’ 
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Hustinx (2010, para. 23) also elevates the need for the graduated response mechanism to 
be in conformity with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, the Data 
Protection Directive and the ePrivacy Directive.  
A large part of these studies have been focused on the legality of the directives and their 
more technical details, which lie outside of the scope of this study. For the purpose of 
this thesis the most interesting part is not whether or not a Directive is compatible with 
European law, but the insights earlier studies have given on the effects of the law and 
the law-making procedure. For example, Bignami’s study of the law-making procedure 
of the Data Retention Directive reveals that the Council’s original proposal would have 
required data retention for a period of one to three years (instead of six months to two 
years) and pushed for the Directive to include retention of data for unsuccessful calls 
and the location of mobile equipment throughout the call (Bignami, 2010, 247-49). 
Similarly, Agarwal’s research shows the aggressive attitude the Commission seems to 
have on implementing sanctions for copyright infringements and the will to include 
monitoring of the private sector.  
Even though policy-making in the EU is non-hierarchical in the sense that the 
Commission doesn’t impose the laws on the member states, it still holds a role as ‘an 
active “bourse of interests and ideas”’ (Löfgren & Webster, 2009, 286), which 
eventually influences what the nationally implemented policy will look like. This means 
that a potential bias of the Commission greatly affects the Internet rights of regular 
citizens throughout the EU. 
2.2.3 The European Commission and co- and self-regulatory approaches to the 
Internet 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the European Commission (and the EU), has engaged in 
developing a wide range of policies for the Internet, spanning several policy sectors. As 
can be deduced from the previous research on the directives presented above, this has 
meant the inclusion of several Directorates-Generales within the Commission. 
According to Cooke (2007, 371), the lack of coherence of EU initiatives has diluted the 
impact and effectiveness of the measures. Moreover, it has also meant that different 
types of mechanisms have been found to be useful in different settings. While Christou 
and Simpson (2011) note that the European Commission has favoured co-regulation 
approaches instead of self-regulation approaches when it comes to Internet architecture 
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governance, Cooke (2007) found that the Commission favoured self-regulatory 
frameworks when it came to the governance of content online.   
For example, in the early days of ICANN, the Commission clearly maintained that 
governments should have a say in the decision-making and oversight of the non-profit 
corporation (Christou & Simpson, 2011, 247). This could, to a part, have to do with the 
fact that ICANN, as a US initiative, was subject to the unilateral oversight of the US 
government. Nevertheless, much thanks to the Commission’s efforts, ICANN’s 
Government Advisory Committee’s (GAC) role was strengthened in 2002 as a result of 
ICANN’s updated policy (Christou & Simpson, 2011, 248). The policy advice from the 
GAC has since been taken much more seriously.  
According to Christou and Simpson (2011, 248), this made ICANN closer to a 
subcontracting multilateral governance model as favoured by the EU. In practice, the 
subcontracting multilateral governance model means that states are involved in setting 
the conditions for rule-making while the private actors are doing the actual managing, 
i.e. shaping the content (Christou & Simpson, 2011, 244). Furthermore, the Commission 
has also stressed the need for government involvement in such co-regulatory regimes, as 
the governments represent accountability (Christou & Simpson 2011, 251-52).  
While quoting the (previous) EU Commissioner for the Information Society and Media, 
Viviane Reading,   Christou and Simpson (2011, 252) note that the Commission regards 
the role of governments in keeping the Internet ‘free and open’ highly important. In 
their conclusion, Christou and Simpson (2011, 253) state that while the Commission 
does not advocate day-to-day management of the Internet by governments, it clearly 
prioritizes government participation in co-regulatory regimes over other actors, or in 
their words, a ‘multilateral governance mode of co-operation.’ 
Conversely, while analyzing The Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human 
Dignity and the Action plan on promoting safe use of the Internet and various other 
policy documents, Cooke (2007, 368-69) discovered that the Commission stresses 
industry self-regulation on all occasions. Essentially, regulation (in this instance 
governance might be a better term) of content on the Internet would be governed by 
industry self-regulation by implementing code of conducts, automated filtering and 
rating mechanisms that would restrict access to material (unsuitable for minors, for 
example), and raising user awareness (Cooke, 2007, 369-70). According to Cooke 
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(2007, 372) the emphasis lied in ‘manipulating social norms’ through awareness 
campaigns and self-regulatory initiatives rather than technical filtering solutions, which 
is a stark contrast to the more formal approaches enacted in the areas of e-commerce, 
data protection and privacy rights. It may be noted, however, that Cooke’s analysis did 
not include how the Commission sees the regulation of copyright infringement, as the 
policy documents analyzed had to do with making the Internet “safer.” Meyer and Van 
Audenhove’s  (2011) study pointed out that France and the UK seemed to favour the 
technical approach rather than awareness raising mechanisms, but it remains to be seen 
whether or not this can be applied to the European Commission as well. 
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3 Policy trade-offs: a battle of interests 
3.1 Structural bias tips the balance 
‘There is no “magic bullet” in Internet regulation, and resolving contested 
policy claims between the moving targets of competitiveness and innovation, 
and public safety and security concerns, is a continual political judgement.’ 
(Marsden, 2010, 3) 
The quote above crystallizes the problem with Internet governance: everything is a 
trade-off. Marsden linked the trade-off to the balance between private enforcement and 
public safety and accountability, but the trade-off applies to other policy areas as well. 
For example, allowing businesses to track user Internet traffic to create increasingly 
accurate behavioural advertising online means weakened data protection for regular 
users. Increasing the demands for ISP data retention of communications and allowing 
easier access to public authorities to said data might increase public safety, but at the 
same time it weakens data protection. Facilitating cooperation between ISPs and media 
producers and distributors might be an effective way of combating illegal file-sharing, 
but at the cost of privacy and data protection.  According to Cooke (2007, 378), for 
example, there is a conflict between initiatives and legislation in the EU that aim to 
protect freedoms, such as freedom of expression and access to information, and policy 
and regulatory output with the primary aim to control access to obscene or racist content 
online. She states that ‘it would appear that, in the EU arena, the desire to control and 
regulate the Internet is taking precedence over measures to promote freedom of 
expression and freedom of enquiry online’ (Cooke, 2007, 378). 
Meyer and Van Audenhove (2010, 69-70) note that living in an information society also 
means living in a surveillance society, referring to the fact that digital traffic is 
monitored constantly – for better or for worse. They continue by stating that 
surveillance is a kind of risk management and social sorting, in that it prioritizes the 
rights and interests of one over another: by decreasing surveillance one might risk 
increased infringement, but by increasing surveillance one decreases privacy and data 
protection. Consequently, those who can frame the issue, decide the monitoring criteria 
and do the actual monitoring are in a very powerful position (Meyer & Van Audenhove, 
2010, 70-71). Essentially, this means that the entity which is given the right to monitor 
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and limit Internet usage also directly affects Internet users’ privacy, data protection and 
even freedom of expression, especially in cases where Internet access can be disabled as 
a sanction.6  Giving the right to monitor and sanction to private actors means granting 
these entities power to interfere with citizen’s rights and freedoms, something that 
traditionally, only courts have been allowed to do. This means that the choice of 
governance mechanisms has direct effects on the realization of rights and freedoms on 
the Internet. Meyer and Van Audenhove (2010, 71) note that if the codes used for 
automatically monitoring infringements are programmed as closed there is a complete 
lack of transparency and that the automated procedure has ‘little assurance that a 
balance between interests and rights will be held.’  
As the argument can be made either way, e.g. either supporting economic rights of 
advertisers or data protection of Internet users, how an entity chooses to frame an issue 
matters a great deal. In the case of  international law, Koskenniemi argues that 
international law is indeterminate, as first, there are several legal regimes which are 
equally binding – in other words, there is a lack of hierarchy, and second, there is an 
exception to every binding rule. He maintains, however, that the ‘system still de facto 
prefers some outcomes or distributive choices to other outcomes or choices,’ which can 
also be called structural bias (Koskenniemi, 2005, 513-15, 606-7, emphasis added). 
Koskenniemi (2007, 5) argues that the choice of legal regime (be it trade law, 
environmental law, human rights law etc.) also determines how a matter will be 
described and which of its aspects are seen as central and which marginal.  
The choice of a specific legal regime reflects what an institution sees as a problem’s 
core, which refers back to what the institution understands as its mission (Koskenniemi, 
2007, 6). This mission is what guides an institution’s structural bias. Koskenniemi 
(2005, 608-9) does not see this as a ‘scandal’, as in any institutional context there is 
always such a structural bias, but a problem arises when ‘the bias works in favour of 
those who are privileged, against the disenfranchised.’ One of the more important points 
to make at this stage is that Koskenniemi (2005, 601-2, 613) sees international law as 
political, and that legal decision-making inevitably includes political choice.  
                                                 
6 See Chapter 2 for a review of the research on the so-called “three strikes” measure. 
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In practice, this means that most legal questions can be interpreted from perspectives 
based on several different regimes. The question of the surveillance of copyright, for 
example, may either be looked at from a trade-related perspective or from a human 
rights perspective. If we look at the World Trade Organization, it is much more 
probable that the organization will choose to look at the problem within the trade 
regime, and more specifically, the TRIPS agreement. The European Court of Human 
Rights would, however, look at the issue from a human rights point of view, primarily 
referring to the right to private life, article 8 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.  
Koskenniemi (2007, 7-8) asserts that ‘political conflict is waged on the description and 
re-description of aspects of the world so as to make them fall under the jurisdiction of 
particular institutions’: although Koskenniemi primarily refers to (international) courts 
and dispute settlement bodies and the choice of jurisdictions, the notion of structural 
bias is applicable on all institutions, although they have no power to settle disputes.  On 
the EU level, this is highly problematic, which connects Koskenniemi’s theory to my 
hypothesis. Broadly speaking, we can say that EU law consists of two legal regimes – 
European Community law and European Human Rights Law. Since the Lisbon treaty 
the two of them form part of the same legislative framework, but before they were seen 
as separate, and they are still enforced by two separate courts, the European Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. As explained above, the European 
Commission is the one that proposes drafts to be approved by the Parliament and the 
Council. In other words, before the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission was strictly 
concerned with law that had to do with economic affairs. This indicates a specific bias 
of the Commission – its mission has been to harmonize legislation which supports 
economic cooperation within the union, or so-called internal market affairs.  
The problem lies in the fact that directives which have been adopted under the First 
Pillar (internal market issues) also affect the rights of European citizens. Directives 
which deal (in part) with Internet governance generally affect the citizen’s right to 
privacy and freedom of expression, for instance. Although the Commission must take 
the European Convention of Human Rights into account, it still looks at an issue from a 
single market point of view. Koskenniemi (2007, 23) points out that although no 
hierarchy between regimes is established, the centre moves, as each regime is 
hegemonic – each regime seeks to make its rationality the dominant one, to govern the 
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rest of the system according to its own logic, to ‘transform its presence into the general 
preference’ (Koskenniemi, 2007, 23). This study will try to find out if, one Directive at 
a time, the Commission is moving the centre of the Internet governance from the 
interests of the European citizens, as exemplified by European Human Rights Law, to 
the economic interests of the union.  
The above polarization is, of course, a gross over-simplification. There is not only one 
“economic interest” as opposed to “public interest” or the interests of European citizens. 
In most cases economic interests of certain stakeholders may be the same as the 
interests of the citizens, although the motives might be different. In Europe, the term 
“general interest” has often been used to express economic benefits that the whole of 
Europe would benefit from. Surely, a strong, European economy lies in the interest of 
its citizens, but reducing the public interest to be synonymous with economic interest is 
not advantageous for everyone. That is also why the EU has chosen to ratify quite wide-
ranging human rights instruments. Human rights instruments are, however, doomed to 
be vague and ambivalent, only ensuring a very basic level of protection, while 
Community directives are much more precise and therefore have more practical 
implications for, in this case, everyday Internet users. The Commission’s structural bias 
is quite easily pinpointed as based in the sphere of economics, but the interesting part is 
seeing which economic interests it prefers over others and what the consequences are 
for a public interest that entails other societal aspects as well. 
There are two important differences between Koskenniemi’s use of structural bias and 
my way of implementing the term. First, Koskenniemi uses structural bias to describe 
the way international organizations with dispute settlement bodies or courts function, in 
other words, institutions that interpret law. I will use the concept to look at the European 
Commission, which is a law drafting body. Before the Lisbon agreement the 
Commission was strictly concerned with First Pillar affairs, but now, with the Lisbon 
treaty, the Commission is also responsible for drafting agreements which purposes are 
to protect civil rights, for instance.7 It will be interesting to see whether or not the 
                                                 
7 Although being bound by the Convention of Human Rights, the EU institutions also drafted their own 
convention in 2000: The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Although the Charter 
contains civil, political and economic rights the articles are not as detailed as the Convention’s. 
Furthermore, the derogatory principle in the Charter (2000, art. 52) permits more leeway than the 
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Commission has succeeded in updating its ideological stance – as Koskenniemi (2005, 
613) notes, it is always necessary to be aware of the bias of one’s own institution. It 
must be noted, however, that the directives analyzed in this thesis date before the 
Lisbon treaty.  Second, Koskenniemi uses structural bias in an international legal 
framework, while I will use it in a European legal context, which is slightly different. 
European law is also international law, but the European Union has an executive body, 
its own courts and a separate legal personality. The relationship between contesting 
legal regimes is therefore a bit different: although no constitution exists, the Lisbon 
treaty is closer to a constitution than an international agreement. In that sense European 
law is more hierarchical than international law in general. 
 	
                                                                                                                                               
Convention: ‘limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’  
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3.2 Media governance and structural bias 
3.2.1 Power shift – from command and control to compliance 
Although Koskenniemi provides a theoretical tool for determining how the choice of 
legal framework guides an institution’s mission and thus its structural bias, the theory 
does not explain how the bias affects the choice of enforcement mechanisms. One way 
of tackling the issue is by looking at the concept of media governance in the European 
Union.  
In terms of media, there has been a shift away from public control and media regulation 
to a ‘new order of media governance’ (Meier, 2011, 156). The emergence of a new 
order of media governance can largely be attributed to a change in the European media 
landscape which required new methods for governing the media. McQuail (2003), 
among others, have attributed the development to the following factors: increased 
deregulation of the media and increased commercialization, increased ownership 
concentration of private media and last, but not least, digitization. The new situation has 
caused a loss of “media sovereignty”, which in turn has led to media regulation failures, 
or as McQuail (2007, 16) puts it, ‘the media scene in Europe can be perceived as 
distinctly more ungoverned, if not ungovernable and more “normless”.’ Meier (2011, 
155) lists ownership concentration as one of the media regulation failures, and notes 
that general competition regulation is not enough when it comes to the media. Michalis 
(2007, 193-95) states that an “orthodoxy of competitiveness” has saturated the policy 
discussions in the EU, especially in the Information and Communications Technology 
(ICT) sector. She argues that competitiveness is a useful political construct that can 
legitimate unpopular policies and that the ‘competitiveness agenda has been hijacked by 
specific interests in the electronic communications sector who stand to benefit from the 
policy rhetoric linking ICT to competitiveness.’ Hirsch and Petersen (2007, 31), on their 
part, state that European Commission values big European players, which could 
possibly compete with North American media corporations on a global scale, rather 
than media pluralism. 
Collins (2009, 99) notes that ‘… in terms of governance, national political authorities’ 
ability to manage media and communications sectors and markets has diminished.’ 
Furthermore, Collins proposes that governments have three governance strategies open 
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to them: 1) liberalize, and hope that limited state-centred governance and network 
governance will produce acceptable outcomes, 2) subsidize certain media organizations 
and communications to secure desired outcomes (according to the public service 
principle) 3) share sovereignty in order to exercise some power (especially within the 
EU).  Media governance is, in other words, used to fill the gaps that media regulation 
has left open. 
Some scholars have pointed out the elusiveness of the term “governance” (see, e.g., 
Karppinen & Moe, 2011; Meier, 2011; Freedman, 2008), and particularly how it differs 
from the concepts media policy and media regulation. Freedman (2008, 14-15) sees that 
media policy refers to the development of goals that lead to the creation of instruments 
which purposes are to shape media structures, media regulation refers to norms that are 
deployed to achieve policy goals and media governance refers to all mechanisms and 
instruments that attempt to organize media systems. In a similar vein, McQuail (2003, 
91) offers a widely cited definition of media governance as ‘all means by which the 
mass media are limited, directed, encouraged, managed or called into account, ranging 
from the most binding law to the most resistible of pressures and self-chosen 
disciplines.’ Meier (2011, 160), following the same line of argument, explains that 
media governance ‘refers to the total of centralized and dispersed mechanisms with the 
aim to organize mass media from the inside, as well as the outside’ but points out that 
‘media governance has to focus on the more institutionalized, as well as the less 
institutionalized, power relations within media organizations, and between the media – 
as political, economic and cultural institutions – and society.’  
In that sense, governance is not limited to practical tools of achieving a desired outcome 
in terms of media output (and pluralism), but it also entails focusing on power structures 
and a struggle of power between big business, civil society, international and national 
organizations and governments (Meier, 2011, 161). Although not limited to, co-
regulation and self-regulation regimes are the most visible tools of media governance 
and the starkest contrast to the “command-and-control” government administration 
mechanisms.  
As stated above, the regulatory systems set up for state-centred broadcasting have 
proved to be ineffective in an era of media conglomerates, and it is for this reason that 
various co- and self-regulatory regimes have increased in popularity, which are essential 
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in the new order of media governance. The power shift has caused state command-and-
control to give way for voluntary compliance regimes. The Internet, however, has not 
really been subject to a state command-and-control regime (especially in Europe), but 
adapted network governance regimes already from the start (Noll, 2002, 212). 
According to Meier (2011, 156), governance is less based on legal rules, instead 
characterized by network control and informal mechanisms. Marsden (2010, 1) notes 
that the traditional reason behind using self- and co-regulatory organizations in the ICT  
sector was that a governance gap had evolved between the economically motivated key 
stakeholders and other end-users, public services and other firms (which one could also 
call representatives of public interest).  
There seems to be slightly different interpretations of how governance mechanisms 
came to dominate the ICT sector. While some scholars, such as Collins, choose to see 
the use of governance mechanisms as a result of government’s inability to regulate the 
media, others maintain that it was partly because of policy decisions that the ICT sector 
came to be unregulated. Michalis (2007, 193, 211) underlines that in order to seize the 
growth potential of the Internet in the 1990s, the EU moved away from harmonization 
through legislation towards harmonization through soft governance mechanisms. This 
coincided with the liberalization of the telecommunications sector, which allowed 
private actors to enter the new emerging market. Similarly, Marsden (2010, 1-2) notes 
that recent developments in the European policy context, such as the Lisbon agenda, 
have created an opening for expanding the regulatory framework of co- and self-
regulatory organizations. Bearing this in mind, new co- and self-regulation 
organizations are not only created spontaneously but are results of deliberate policy 
considerations. 
Marsden (2010, 6), while citing the Audio Visual Media Services Directive, defines 
self-regulation as a voluntary initiative which neither requires nor aims to achieve state 
cooperation, while co-regulation has some sort of a legal link between self-regulation 
and the national legislator, allowing for the possibility of state intervention if objectives 
are not met. Marsden (2010, 21) also provides a more detailed ‘Beaufort Scale’ of co- 
and self-regulation (0-11), which shows that a clear division between the two cannot be 
made. Rather, the shift from co- to self-regulation is gradual and governments are also 
involved in self-regulatory organizations, either through merely participating in 
discussions (1 on the scale) or by recognizing the organization as having a formal policy 
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role (7 on the scale). Co-regulation on Marsden’s Beaufort scale (8-11) means that the 
organization is, in one way or another, accountable to the government. In terms of 
effectiveness, self-regulation organizations have positive outcomes: participants might 
me more motivated to comply to the rules, the self-governing rules may have greater 
credibility since they are drafted by industry experts, the organizations are more flexible 
and can adapt more quickly to change and from a state’s perspective, they are much 
cheaper to maintain (Marsden, 2010, 35-6).  
It may be noted, however, that the different accounts on the reason behind endorsing 
governance mechanisms is partly due to the fact that some scholars choose to look at 
content and other at infrastructure. Content regulation is, undeniably, more difficult on 
the Internet than infrastructure regulation. In the EU, infrastructure regulation has 
traditionally been drafted within the European regulatory framework while content has 
been national. This has made a comprehensive regulatory framework difficult to achieve 
(Michalis, 2007, 192). According to Michalis (2007, 242-46), the distinction between 
content and infrastructure is artificial and problematic in a technologically converging 
market. She argues that decisions on standards and gateways have serious implications 
for public policy issues such as access to content and services.  
One of the more commonly expressed concerns about this type of network governance 
is that it implies a democratic deficit as the industry in effect governs itself. Pointing out 
that self-regulatory arrangements can be more decisive, flexible and effective and purely 
intergovernmental regimes cumbersome, Christou and Simpson (2011, 244) support the 
theoretical middle ground of co-regulation but underline that their effectiveness has yet 
to be properly researched. Collins (2009, 97) claims that no notion of network failure in 
governance exists. He expresses his concern for networks’ ability to take into account 
the interests of the marginalized and that the values of networks tend to converge with 
the interests of those networked. Michalis (2007, 212-13) is equally concerned with the 
lack of sanctions and that governance mechanisms often lack in transparency and 
legitimacy. Meier (2011, 162) adds that this indicates that there is a fundamental power 
asymmetry in terms of participation, even in co-regulatory organizations where civil 
society has a fixed role, as civil society does not possess the same resources as media 
organizations.   
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Meier (ibid.) raises other concerns as well: first, hierarchy and power are often 
neglected when discussing networks, and second, there seems to be an over-estimation 
of social actors’ willingness to participate in governance agreements. Marsden (2010, 
12) came to the same conclusion while interviewing Internet governance experts: 
according to them, many Internet companies have ‘neither the resources nor the 
incentive to perform compliance functions beyond the bare minimum required.’ 
Furthermore, in cases where the self-regulation organizations have been formed 
spontaneously without European Commission or government involvement or 
intervention, the organization’s actions tend to follow the participants’ own, perceived 
best interests rather than the public interest (Marsden, 2010, 25). Marsden (2010, 27) 
underlines that the level of participation also correlates with whose interests are directly 
affected and level of compliance with whose interests are most closely aligned with the 
organization’s preferences, which correlates with Collins’ concern. One could therefore 
claim that choosing co- and self-regulation over government command-and-control 
means choosing economic over public interest.  
3.2.2 Internet public interest – conflict of values?  
Defining public interest can be quite difficult, as it is in a way a catch-all for everything 
that might affect a large number of people positively within a society.  Some have even 
discredited it for being useful at all due to its degree of ambiguity and lack of agreement 
on its definition.8 As Bozeman (2007, 84) points out, ‘many concepts of the public 
interest are virtually indistinguishable from more general concerns of morality.’ 
According to Napoli (2001, 64-65), the ambiguity of the public interest has to do with 
the fact that academics have failed to distinguish between the concept’s different levels. 
Instead of talking of public interest on a general note, he proposes that public interest 
should be examined at three different levels: the conceptual level, the operational level 
and the applicational level (Napoli, 2007, 69-70).  
He claims that on the conceptual level, most would agree that public interest is a 
unitary, coherent scheme of values (the unitary interpretation), rather than just a product 
of a democratic process (the procedural approach) or majoritarian conceptualizations, 
                                                 
8 See Napoli, 2001, and Bozeman, 2007 for a presentation on different scholars’ views on the subject 
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which are determined by what one could call the will of the people (Napoli, 2001, 72-
77). It is just that no one has provided an exact definition of what these values are. This 
brings Napoli (2001, 83-86, 94) to conclude that the operational level, which provides 
the principles and values that are associated with serving the public interest, is still 
poorly defined due to contesting views on the subject and lack of outspoken formal 
criteria.  
Napoli (2001, 90) sees the impact this has on the applicational level, which is where the 
actual policy decisions are made and regulatory standards imposed, as highly 
problematic: 
‘The lack of specificity of the public interest standard at the operational level 
results in a greater likelihood of applications that favour industry interests, 
without a sufficient analytical basis as to whether such applications 
simultaneously serve the interests of the broader public.’  
In media governance in Europe, public interest has usually been equalled with media 
pluralism, and in effect meant restrictions on content and advertising and wishes to limit 
media concentration (Harcourt, 2005, 58, 65). It is clear that diversity and qualitative 
content is also desirable online, but I would claim that it is not the primary public 
interest concern. As the Internet provides almost everyone with Internet access to 
become producers of content, pluralism is less threatened and equal access to the 
Internet is more important, as can also be deduced from the WSIS Geneva Declaration 
of Principles, which acknowledges the need to distribute information technology more 
evenly (WSIS, 2003, recital 10). Similarly, Michalis (2007, 217) lists other general 
interest services which are related to the infrastructure of the Internet: continuity of 
access, universal service, quality of service, affordability and interconnectivity. 
What makes defining the public interest regarding the Internet difficult is its dual 
character – on the one hand, it’s a medium, but on the other hand it is also an 
infrastructure. Equating the Internet with television is not a functioning comparison; 
similarly, the railroad analogy is insufficient as well. Bearing this in mind, Internet 
public interest can be looked at from several different perspectives, and I have chosen to 
examine it from a human rights point of view as it can include issues related to content 
and infrastructure as well as data protection and privacy. I will now try to relate these 
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interests to the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘the Convention’) to 
the best of my ability. Paragraph 1, Article 10 of the Convention states that  
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article 
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television 
or cinema enterprises.’  
Living in an information society entails that participation in such a society necessitates 
access to information. I would argue that today, having at least sporadic access to the 
Internet is required to fill that condition. In Finland this right has been recognized, as 
broadband Internet is regarded as a “universal service”, meaning that all consumers and 
companies must have access to an Internet connection with a minimum speed of 1 
megabyte per second (Mbps) (FICORA, 2010). The Universal Service Directive (2002) 
also acknowledges that ‘connections to the public telephone network at a fixed location 
should be capable of supporting speech and data communications at rates sufficient for 
access to online services such as those provided via the public Internet.’  
The Directive does not, however, provide any minimum data rate, and in practice this 
makes the provision useless, as websites are becoming increasingly data heavy and a 56 
Kbps narrowband connection would perhaps be enough to access the websites, but the 
lack of Internet connection speed would make the online experience insupportable. 
What is sufficient for access to online services today? Being able to access your email 
or shop smoothly online? Following social media? A smooth video feed from a video 
streaming service? 
 There is considerable policy effort to realize broadband penetration in all of Europe; the 
European Commission’s Digital Agenda (2010) states as follows: ‘[t]o match world 
leaders like South Korea and Japan, Europe needs download rates of 30 Mbps for all of 
its citizens and at least 50% of European households subscribing to Internet connections 
above 100 Mbps by 2020.’ Being connected to the Internet also includes disseminating 
information, thus being able to effectively realize the right to communicate or freedom 
of expression. There is, however, another side to the question. Paragraph 2 of Article 10 
states that  
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‘The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.’ 
This is a practical example of Koskenniemi’s theory about the ambiguity of 
international law; to every rule there is an exception. The ambiguity of the cases where 
exceptions are allowed makes it quite easy to find an argument for limiting someone’s 
access to the Internet: the nature of the disorder or crime is not specified, and could 
therefore include, for example, copyright infringement. The only limiting factors in this 
case is that the restriction should be prescribed by law and be necessary.  
Hoikka (2009, 68) elevates that the article has been criticized for being far too open and 
leaving a lot of room for interpretation. This makes the requirement of necessity the 
most important struggle for balance between the freedom and its limitation, a balance 
which the European Court of Human Rights has tried to strike (Hoikka, 2009, 69). The 
form of communication is also protected, not only the expressed information or content 
(Hoikka, 2009, 71). As the second paragraph shows, it can be in the public’s interest to 
limit a user’s Internet access. But what kind of limitation would be called necessary or 
proportionate? As I argued above, living in an information society requires access to the 
Internet, and therefore any measure which limits citizens’ access to the Internet also 
effectively excludes those citizens from society. What kind of crime or disorder would 
allow for such social exclusion? Is Internet subscription suspension in cases of 
copyright infringement a necessity?  
The problem lies in the scope of the sanction: while effectively limiting the perpetrator 
from committing online copyright infringement, the sanction at the same time limits the 
perpetrator’s right to access information. Although the European Court of Human 
Rights has significant power in how the articles will be interpreted, the Commission can 
still tilt the balance through various directives (and international agreements), for 
example by enforcement provisions in copyright directives or ACTA. If, as my 
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hypothesis indicates, the Commission is biased towards economic interests rather than 
say, the protection of fundamental rights, this would mean that disorders which cause 
economic disturbance could be seen as sufficient factors for limiting the right to 
information and freedom of expression. 
Continuing the thought of information society as surveillance society, it becomes clear 
that article 8 of the ECHR, which determines the right to respect for private and family 
life, is of great importance when discussing Internet-related rights. The article states as 
follows: 
‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.’ 
Following a strict interpretation of this article, developing web services becomes almost 
impossible. Web shops, for example, require cookies that track user traffic (i.e. 
correspondence), web analytics tools for monitoring site visits can be seen as too 
invasive and targeted advertising based on tracking a user’s Internet use is quite clearly 
out of the question. The only element supporting such activities is the clause ‘is 
necessary … in the interests of economic well-being of the country (emphasis added).’ It 
is questionable whether Facebook selling advertisements for online poker to 25 to 30 
year old males is absolutely necessary for a country’s economic well-being. It is 
nevertheless quite obvious that Internet usage requires at least modest privacy invasion. 
The question is yet again when the invasions on private life become disproportionate.  
The Data Retention Directive, for example, was realized to combat terrorism. In that 
sense, data retention (and thus invasion of the right to privacy) is legitimized by 
reference to protecting national security and public safety. The same argument is also 
heard outside the European Union. As Honourable Justice Brennnan (1991, 10) states, 
civil liberties in the US are treated poorly in times of war, and rights are sacrificed 
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especially in those cases where no detailed jurisprudence exists and the only guarantees 
are abstract principles. One of the major lessons that Brennan (1991, 17-18) points out 
is that ‘the perceived threats to national security that have motivated the sacrifice of 
civil liberties during times of crisis are often overblown and factually unfounded.’ To 
sum up, it lies in the interest of the public that some amount of data tracking is allowed 
(to permit Internet transactions), but on the other hand one can question whether the 
retention of communication’s data of all citizens with the aim of finding security threats 
is proportionate when there is little guarantee of the measures’ effectiveness. 
Returning to the question of governance, in practice choosing co- and self-regulation 
means choosing industry interests over public interest, which might have negative 
effects on European Internet user’s freedom of expression or data protection, as with the 
case of graduated response or the ‘three strikes’ policy.9 In some matters, economic 
interests of the industry and the Internet users might coincide, however. For example, 
Internet service providers are reluctant in increasing data retention or monitoring of 
their subscribers as this is a significant cost for the company both in terms of 
administration and in terms of negative publicity possibly resulting in loss of revenue. 
Meier’s (2011, 164) solution to ensure that public interest is taken into account is to 
institutionalize civil society participation (and not only consultation), something he calls 
‘democratic media governance.’ The state’s role would therefore be to establish the 
institutional setting for the civil society organizations and media organizations. 
What is particularly worrisome is that the European Union’s policy output represents a 
fundamentally economic approach (Harcourt, 2005, 199).  Therefore lack of public 
interest might be downplayed and the political aspect of choosing co- and self-
regulation ignored. If the results of this research show that the Commission favours co- 
and self-regulatory regimes when it comes to Internet governance, this would also 
indicate that economic interests are valued higher than public interest in the online 
context. Bearing in mind that the Commission used to be concerned with First Pillar 
issues, it would not be surprising if it turned out that the economic approach prevails in 
EU policy regarding the Internet as well. Still, one must bear in mind that certain private 
interests can be beneficial for the public interest, and valuing economic interests might 
not be a threat in and of itself. It is in cases where the public interest and the private 
                                                 
9 See Chapter 2.2.1. 
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interests of certain stakeholders are diametrically opposed that the question becomes 
important, and the aim of the following chapters is to see how the Commission balances 
these interests.  
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4 The Commission governs the Internet 
4.1 Method  
To determine the interests which the Commission primarily represent, I will look at 
Commission proposals for directives that, in one way or another, affect how the Internet 
is governed. In practice this means examining the following documents: the e-
Commerce Proposal (COM 98/0325 (COD)), the ePrivacy Proposal (2000/0189 
(COD)), the IPR Enforcement Proposal (2003/0024 (COD)), the second IPR 
Enforcement Proposal (2005/0127(COD)), and the EU Data Retention Proposal 
(2005/0182 (COD)).  
I will also analyze the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, as the Commission has 
been highly involved in its drafting and the Parliament has not participated in the 
drafting of the agreement. In that sense it is comparable to the proposals for Directives – 
neither the Parliament nor the Council were involved in the drafting process, which 
means that the Commission’s view is represented to a great extent. 
The purpose of analyzing the drafts is to determine how the Commission tries to 
influence the effective governance of the Internet through legislation and which 
interests the Commission usually takes into account. To some extent it may be useful to 
compare the draft directives with the directives that were approved, but for the most part 
I will rely on the drafts since they represent the Commission’s views and opinions, as 
opposed to the directives which also include the Parliament’s and Council’s 
considerations. As mentioned above, the approach used is a hybrid between policy 
analysis and analysis of legal processes. The proposals for Directives may not yet be 
binding, but they fill all the formal criteria for directives – as such, they are legislation 
which have yet not been reviewed by interested parties.  
The proposals offer a more crystallized picture of the Commission’s policy goals than 
Green Papers or other policy documents, and as the objective is to make the documents 
binding, one may argue that they represent what the Commission really aims to achieve 
instead of empty rhetoric. I will not, however, look at the law-drafting process as a 
whole – the proposal is clearly the first and most important step from a regulatory point 
of view, but obviously, the Council and the Parliament also affect the outcome. The 
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Commission should have, it must be noted, taken all interested parties into account in 
the drafting process. Sometimes this has been achieved by referring to earlier 
consultative procedures performed by the Commission, other times the inclusion of civil 
society and the private sector is less straightforward. 
 
Due to the piecemeal character of Internet legislation, the above directives and 
agreements have a much broader scope than matters related to the web and web usage, 
only certain parts of the directives and proposals will be relevant for my research. This 
is also part of the problem: instead of creating a common framework for all Internet 
legislation the Commission has decided to integrate questions relating to the Internet 
with legislation that to a large extent deals with the same policy area but addresses 
questions which are only relevant in a world of physical goods and services.  
Being able to map the interests of different stakeholders is an important part of trying to 
determine how the Commission balances interests. Trying to determine the interests of 
different stakeholders is, by far, the trickiest part of the analysis. Directive proposals 
and international agreements are still quite straight-forward in terms of who the 
interested parties might be. In the question of copyright, for example, the concerned 
parties are obviously the right holders, which are media content and software producers 
and publishers, copyright collectives and original creators, intermediaries, such as ISPs 
and hosting companies and consumers/defendants.  One source for determining interests 
is Meyer and Van Audenhove’s (2010) research on graduated response, a method used 
in France, Ireland and the UK to deter online copyright infringement.10 Meyer and Van 
Audenhove (2010, 72-73) concluded that ‘rights holders (except publishers) supported 
graduated response, while citizen and digital rights groups and Internet service 
providers (except when having a stake in the content industry) opposed the measure.’ 
On another note, research has shown that regulation that prevents violating the Internet 
user’s privacy makes targeted advertising more difficult and therefore reduces the 
surfer’s buying incentives (Goldfarb & Tucker, 2010). 
Even though mapping the interests of different parties could be a research project of 
itself, I will use earlier research, ownership figures and information about private actors’ 
                                                 
10 See Chapter 2.2. 
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business models to create an analytical tool which will help me analyze the documents 
presented above.11 In other words, I do not claim to be able to understand all the 
interests of the different stakeholders, but merely some of the more fundamental issues 
that arise in questions related to online publishing, copyright and access to information.  
The actual method I will be using is document analysis, based in the tradition of 
Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA). To make sure that my analysis is consistent I will use 
a core category that is used to explain the relations between the themes found in the 
research material. Although my primary sources are the proposals for Directives, I will 
use other information and secondary sources to provide contextual information.  
I will simply refer to the different stages of the analytical process as the elemental 
coding phase and the secondary coding phase.  In the elemental coding phase, relevant 
data is tagged, and data which is not explicitly related to issues related to the Internet 
and Internet governance is discounted. The secondary coding phase is concerned with 
labelling the tagged material according to specific themes, and connecting the themes to 
the core categories and certain stakeholders (see Appendix Fig. 2 for an example). The 
coded material will allow me to analyze the proposals consistently and help me examine 
the connections between the categories. 
The documents are divided into three groups: e-commerce, data protection and 
intellectual property rights. Naturally, the proposal for a Directive on e-Commerce is in 
the first group, the second group contains the proposals for the ePrivacy Directive and 
the Data Retention Directive, while the third group consists of the two proposals for IPR 
Enforcement Directives and ACTA.  
Although the themes are instrumental in describing the focus points of the proposals, 
they do not illustrate in what way the different proposals might be interconnected. For 
this reason the core categories for this whole research are a) data protection, which 
                                                 
11 For instance, Alison Harcourt’s book The European Union and the regulation of media markets has 
been instrumental in providing me with information on media organizations in Europe, Richard Collins’ 
book Three myths of Internet governance: making sense of networks, governance and regulation has 
provided me with excellent insight into the Internet governance regimes in Europe. The financial models I 
refer to can be crudely divided into the following categories of income: advertising revenue (such as 
Google and Facebook, but also commercial television and newspapers), subscriptions (such as 
newspapers and ISPs), royalties or selling of audio-visual material (such as record labels) or software 
(such as Microsoft) to both consumers and other businesses, and financial models based on taxes or state-
subsidies (public service broadcasters). 
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includes privacy, questions of data tracking and anonymity, b) freedom of expression, 
which entails access to the Internet, Internet content supervision, and c) stakeholder 
responsibilities and obligations, which entails the proportionality of governance 
measures, responsibility of different parties and media policy approaches, management 
of rights and so on. At first glance it would seem like the categories are too different to 
be equated. Data protection and freedom of expression are, quite clearly, rights-related 
while stakeholder responsibilities are more focused on administration, enforcement and 
implementation. The connecting factor is that they all represent ideological choices. As 
noted in the presentation of the theoretical framework, the choice of governance 
mechanisms also reflect certain ideological preferences. 
 
Figure 1: Core categories 
Thesis core categories Connected categories 
a) data protection privacy 
  online anonymity 
  data tracking 
  data retention 
  data sharing 
b) freedom of expression access to the Internet 
  Internet censorship 
  Internet content supervision 
  freedom of use 
c) stakeholder 
responsibilities and 
obligations 
effective enforcement 
  proportionality of governance measures 
  media policy 
  governance regime 
  ownership 
  division of responsibility 
Note: The connected categories presented in Fig. 1 are not exclusive, but are 
merely used to illustrate the main areas of interest in each core category. 
The outset for this research is that these categories influence each other and that a law or 
policy which affects one of the categories will affect the others. These categories will 
serve as guidelines for my analysis. For example, although I have assigned the 
proposals into three thematic groups, how the European Internet is affected depends on 
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how the thematic group is connected to issues of freedom of expression, data protection 
and the rights and obligations of stakeholders. 
It must be underlined, however, that this division does not mean that these groups of 
documents are only concerned with the themes I have assigned them – quite the 
contrary, as most issues related to the Internet are highly interconnected, but rather, that 
the theme has served as the starting point for the argumentation or is one of the main 
concerns, as can usually be seen by looking at the directives’ titles.  
The first group’s (e-commerce) primary themes are the following: privacy, storage of 
data, anonymity and encryption, data tracking and technological challenges. E-
commerce is quite naturally a very wide theme, as it entails multiple types of business 
models. Although the same rules are applicable, the reason behind the storage of data 
can be very different depending on the service provider. In some cases, user information 
might be a business in itself, which is the case for social media businesses such as 
Facebook. Facebook relies on advertisement revenue, and the primary reason for 
businesses to advertise on Facebook is that the company can target advertisements 
accurately for certain groups of consumers. The same, of course, applies to Google. The 
data collection does not only include user submitted information, but also the usage of 
tracking cookies (which makes it possible to track user web traffic) to determine what 
websites and products people might be interested in.  
For web shops, on the other hand, one of the primary concerns is being able to use 
cookies and store data in order to make the online shopping experience as smooth as 
possible – this might include providing pre-filled forms for returning customers, 
keeping language preferences, storing shopping information without customer login and 
so on. In other words, in the first group, the objective is to make business on 
information, while the second group uses information to create better customer 
experiences. The roles are naturally not as clearly divided as presented above:  a lot of 
data traffic information collection is used to make web experiences better, and web 
shops might want to reach potential customers as advertisers as well. The basic business 
models remain different, however. 
When analyzing the proposals in the data protection group I will concentrate on finding 
how the following themes are presented in the documents: user control over data, 
differences between the digital and analogue environment, national and personal 
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security, privacy, software business interests, Internet service provider interests, data 
tracking and technological challenges. Although one of the main problems of Internet 
governance is not the rules per se, but how the rules are effectively governed, it will be 
interesting to see how the Commission aims to cope with this issue through amending 
the legislation. 
The third group (intellectual property rights) differs slightly from the first two. One of 
the most important goals with the analysis is to look at how the provisions that are 
concerned with digital intellectual property rights infringement differ from “regular” 
copyright infringement. The concerned parties are roughly the following: media and 
software companies and publishers, original creators of digital content, licensing 
bodies/copyright collectives, Internet service providers, hosting providers, Internet users 
and consumers as well as copyright infringers. In addition, the following themes will be 
relevant for the analysis: proportionality of offences and damages, enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, prevention of IPR infringement, defendant rights, third party 
involvement (especially ISPs) and the definition of what constitutes a commercial 
activity.   
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4.2 The Commission’s take on e-commerce 
4.2.1 Stimulating the ICT sector  
The e-Commerce Directive was basically the first Directive to address the Internet 
specifically. As such, it is still today a corner stone for all Internet-related activities 
within the European Union. The goal with the Directive was to stimulate cross-border 
trade and strengthen consumer trust in European companies (e-Commerce Proposal, 
1998, 4), thus ensuring that the sector would keep on growing. According to the 
Commission (and many others), there were legal barriers that prevented especially small 
and medium businesses from benefitting from the entire internal market. Legislation on 
e-commerce differed in the fifteen member states, which essentially meant that any 
business willing to sell their goods to citizens of another European country would have 
to take the other country’s national legislation into account. There were, for example, 
discrepancies as to when a contract was concluded, what the role of intermediaries was, 
what constituted a commercial communication and so forth (e-Commerce Proposal, 
1998, 7).  
A survey the Commission conducted showed that legal searches, which examined the 
differences in legislation, could be very costly for small and medium companies, which 
often led to them avoiding trying to penetrate markets in other countries altogether (e-
Commerce Proposal, 1998, 8-10). By harmonizing the rules for e-commerce the 
Commission hoped to create an incentive for smaller businesses to target a wider 
European audience (e-Commerce Proposal, 1998, 60-61). At the same time, divergent 
practices created uncertainty among consumers. By clarifying certain aspects of 
electronic contracts and demanding companies to supply basic information, the 
Commission hoped that consumers would more readily shop online and stimulate cross-
border trade. 
The five issues the Commission wanted to address were thus the following: 
First, it wanted to remove legal barriers for online services, essentially meaning 
harmonization within the European Union. It may be noted all Commission initiated 
legislation must be based on the fact that the issue at hand is of such character that the 
member states could not handle it individually, and as such most EU Directives has the 
goal of harmonizing legislation. 
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Second, it wanted to clarify what a commercial communication is and what rules apply. 
The proposal wanted to make certain transparency requirements, such as separating ads 
from other content, indicating when a website is sponsored by a company or require 
companies to state that an email has been sent for marketing purposes. 
Third, the Commission wanted to harmonize the online conclusion of contracts. Some 
countries still required a person’s physical presence to conclude contracts, which meant 
that e-commerce was practically impossible. Some states saw that a contract was 
concluded when someone clicked on an “OK” button, while others regarded that a 
contract had been made when the customer had received a receipt for the purchase. 
The fourth issue was the role of intermediaries and their responsibilities. For the 
Internet to function, a lot of third party services are needed. There are the Internet 
Service Providers, for one, that provide the infrastructure and allow their customers to 
communicate with each other and other servers. There are companies which provide 
hosting services (i.e. server space), so that companies can have online presence without 
investing in computers or Internet connections that can keep up with many thousand 
visits a day. Servers also cache so-called cookies on the clients’ computers in order to 
make the web experience faster and more effective, and they also store some 
information on their client at the same time. The Commission wanted to limit the 
liability of these service providers in order to reduce the risks in providing these 
services. If all service providers would have to be responsible for everything that was 
stored on their servers or transmitted along their cables, few would be willing to invest 
in the business, as it would require constant monitoring of all activities, something that 
would be extremely expensive and raise severe data protection issues. 
The Commission was afraid that the current situation created an incentive for “forum 
shopping”, i.e. hosting service providers would choose countries that had the most 
favourable legal regime (e-Commerce Proposal, 1998, 12). If the issue was not 
addressed, this could mean that online services would be established outside the 
European Union and provide services to the European citizens, paralyzing the growth of 
European businesses in the e-commerce sector (e-Commerce Proposal, 1998, 61). 
Last, the Commission wanted to strengthen enforcement mechanisms by encouraging 
members to develop codes of conduct and stimulate administrative cooperation between 
member states and their agencies. Although essentially a soft law mechanism, the 
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Commission probably realized that no binding cooperative agreements could be drafted 
at that stage, since the Internet was still very much in development in 1998.  
Although focused on economic activities, the Proposal would cover almost the entire 
Internet. Not only were sales of goods or services covered, but also the free provision of 
information remunerated by commercial communication (e-Commerce Proposal, 1998, 
7). This means that most of the Internet is covered by the Directive, since a lot of 
websites rely on advertising, regardless of content – one major exception is Wikipedia, 
which is deliberately kept advertising-free.  
One point of concern was determining where e-commerce took place. Since the 
Commission wanted to apply a country of origin rule, meaning that online companies 
would only have to succumb to the legislation of the state they were established in, 
defining the place of establishment was of great importance. A company operating 
primarily on the Internet could be based in one country, have its servers in another and 
direct its services towards clients in a third. The Commission clarified that the place of 
establishment is concerned with the actual nature of the economic activity rather than 
the formal criteria, such as where a letter-box is situated or the location of the 
technology used (e-Commerce Proposal, 1998, 19-20). The establishment of the 
provider would thus be defined by its ‘centre of activities’.  
Furthermore, article 3(2) states that  
‘Member States may not, for reasons falling within this Directive’s coordinated 
field, restrict the freedom to provide Information Society services from another 
Member State.’ 
This, in combination with the country of origin rule, means that states are not allowed to 
censor services provided by companies from other member states. Although the 
motivation is economic and legal, the end result is a highly political provision, which 
suggests that the values of the union should be unitary. The Commission did provide 
some exceptions, however. Article 3 does not apply in cases of copyright, neighbouring 
rights, or industrial property rights, contractual obligations concerning consumer 
contracts or unsolicited commercial communications by email, as well as a few 
administrative provisions. Additionally, the proposal allowed for the same derogations 
that can be found in most human rights instruments: 
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‘By way of derogation from Article 3(2), and without prejudice to court action, 
the competent authorities of Member States may take such measures restricting 
the freedom to provide an Information Society service as are consistent with 
Community law and with the following provisions:  
(a) the measures shall be: 
(i) necessary for one of the following reasons: 
 public policy, in particular the prevention, investigation, detection 
and prosecution of criminal offences, including the protection of 
minors and the fight against any incitement to hatred on grounds of 
race, sex, religion or nationality,  
 the protection of public health, 
 public security, 
 consumer protection;’ 
By looking at the above provisions, one can note that the Commission granted states 
quite a lot of wiggle room when defining when it would be appropriate to terminate 
information society services.  
On the plus side, the drafting group realized that demanding too much of the service 
providers could stifle innovation and force information society service providers to 
operate outside of the union. Articles 12, 14 and 15 are of particular interest. Article 
12(1), or the ‘Mere conduit’ provision, states that 
‘Member States shall provide in their legislation that the provider of such a 
service shall not be liable, otherwise than under a prohibitory injunction, for 
the information transmitted, on condition that the provider: a) does not initiate 
the transmission; b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and c) 
does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission.’ 
This article effectively renders ISPs unaccountable for any potentially illegal acts their 
subscribers might commit. Similarly, article 15(1) states that there is no general 
obligation to monitor subscriber communications: 
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‘Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers … to 
monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation 
actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.’  
It can be deduced from the above provisions that the Commission took great note of the 
Data Protection Directive when they were drafting this document – they were careful 
not to encourage data mining. The was also a purely economic reason – gathering and 
analyzing data can be very time consuming and expensive, which would stifle 
competition as only the big, established players would have the resources needed to 
monitor. Targeted and temporary surveillance activities were not outlawed, however, as 
long as they were required by national judicial authorities in accordance with national 
law. 
What is exceptional is that article 15 also covers hosting service providers and not only 
ISPs. Article 14 states that hosting service providers are exempt from liability as long as 
they are unaware of the illegal activity that is taking place and that they take action 
when they obtain information that something illegal is being stored on their servers, the 
so-called notice-and-take-down procedure. Ironically, much of subsequent Internet 
legislation in the EU has been devoted to narrowing down the freedoms and guarantees 
provided by the e-Commerce Directive. The most fundamental of the changes would 
have to be the partial reversal of the no general obligation to monitor clause, which I 
will analyze in subchapters 4.3 and 4.4.  
4.2.2 Harmonization versus national sovereignty 
The e-Commerce Proposal is a remarkably well-drafted document. It takes the nature of 
the Internet into account and it seems like it has addressed the problems it set out to 
solve, namely make the legislative status of information society services clearer within 
Europe and make sure that consumers are well-informed of the services provided. The 
proposal would make it harder for illegitimate businesses to operate and consumers are 
provided general information about their rights and the service provider’s place of 
establishment. Service providers should also have been pleased, as the freedom from 
liability allows businesses to function smoothly without risk for law suits that are 
actually aimed at someone else.  
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The only real loss is that of national media sovereignty, which was eventually reduced 
further by including more reasons for derogation of the freedom to provide services 
clause. Although seemingly minor changes, the small additions granted the member 
states increased censorship rights. For example, public security also includes the 
protection of national security and defence, and instead of referring to consumer 
protection the final article refers to consumers and investors. The ‘competent 
authorities’ part has also been left out, which means that member states do not have to 
define which agency has censorship powers. The reasons provided cover such a broad 
spectrum of activities that it would be almost impossible to stop states from derogating 
from the provisions if they really wanted to. Although there are some procedural 
guarantees in place (which can also be derogated from in a case of urgency, article 3(5)) 
this indicates that there was not enough political will to surrender some media 
sovereignty to the union. Considering that the Internet is of a borderless nature, which 
was also realized by the Commission, this particular provision only shows that there is a 
lack of trust the union’s enforcement powers. Most of the reasons stated above were 
already included in various human rights documents, all binding for the members of the 
union, with the possible exception of the protection of consumers and investors 
Consumer protection is also a major theme in the Proposal, but at the same time one 
cannot help but draw the conclusion that the Commission fundamentally sees the 
citizens of Europe as consumers, as exemplified by equating the general interest to 
consumer protection (e-Commerce Proposal, 1998, 17). There is one single reference to 
the cultural values of the Internet, and even in that case the aim is to ‘construct Europe’ 
by promoting trade in order to ‘increase knowledge of their [the European citizens’] 
cultural diversity’ (e-Commerce Proposal, 1998, 6). The Commission’s draft proposal is 
very well drafted considering that this was in 1998 and the Internet’s full potential had 
yet been realized. What is particularly impressive is that DG XV (currently known as 
DG Internal Market and Services) took the functioning and infrastructure of the Internet 
so well into account.  
Although the e-Commerce Proposal reduces cultural encounters to cross-border trade 
and general interest to consumer protection, the end result is highly positive. Surely, one 
would have hoped that the first Directive to address the Internet in its entirety could 
have elevated the cultural aspects of the Internet as well, but bearing in mind the 
economic spectacles the legislators of DG XV were wearing the end result is not bad 
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from a public interest perspective. In the case of e-commerce, the economic interests of 
ISPs, hosting service providers and other Information Society service providers 
coincided with rights connected to data protection and freedom of expression. It is, 
however, easy to see that IPR owners were displeased with both the proposal and the 
subsequent directive.  
Even the support for self-regulation mechanisms raises little concerns. Although self-
regulation may be a tool for businesses to pursue their own interests, supporting the use 
of codes of conduct in e-Commerce might have purely positive effects as long as they 
are transparent; codes of conduct, trustmarks, web shop rankings and so forth may 
actually foster consumer confidence in Information Society services. If, however, the 
notice and take down procedures were developed in such a manner that no intervention 
by law enforcement agencies or courts would be required, the public interest might be at 
stake as private corporations could effectively censor the Internet.  
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4.3 The Commission’s take on data protection  
4.3.1 The ePrivacy Directive 
The purpose of the ePrivacy Directive was to update the then somewhat antiquated data 
protection legislation, i.e. the data protection Directive and the Directive concerning 
processing of personal data in the telecom sector (ePrivacy Proposal, 2000, recital 1 & 
3, 14). Although the previous directives did offer quite a lot of protection of citizen’s 
data, the legislation drafted in the nineties had not foreseen all the commercial and other 
purposes on the foundation of which private and public entities might use and misuse 
consumer and citizen data. The aim of the ePrivacy Directive was to take these new 
developments into account but at the same time create a document which would 
guarantee data protection regardless of the communications technology used. This was 
because IP telephony was raising a lot of questions and the Commission wanted to 
harmonize the legislation throughout Europe for services that were essentially the same, 
even though another technology was used for transmitting the data. 
The Directive itself was drafted by DG Information Society under the direction of 
Commissioner Erkki Liikanen. Recent technological developments led the Commission 
to focus on three areas: first, all traffic data should be covered by the Directive, second, 
an obligation to inform users of data being stored was to be included and third, new, 
location-based services needed to be regulated (ePrivacy Proposal, 2000, 3-6). In order 
not to hamper innovation, the new Directive set out to determine that in addition to 
billing data, further traffic data could be stored as long as this was used for creating 
value-added services to the user which the subscriber consented to. In practice this 
meant that websites would be able to store so-called cookies on the client’s computer to 
create a better online experience. The data retention could only be executed on the 
condition that the user knew exactly what data was being stored (ePrivacy Proposal, 
2000, 4). According to Article 6(1&2), traffic data could only be stored for the purpose 
of the communication and had to be erased or made anonymous after the 
communication was completed – unless, of course, the data was used for creating a 
value-added service the subscriber had consented to or for the processing of billing 
information. 
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Tapping and interception of communications and traffic data was clearly forbidden in 
the Proposal. Article 5(1) states that 
‘Member States shall ensure the confidentiality of communications and the 
related traffic data by means of a public communications network and publicly 
available electronic communications services, through national legislation. In 
particular, they shall prohibit listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of 
interception or surveillance of communications and the related traffic data, by 
persons other than users, without the consent of the users concerned, except 
when legally authorised to do so, in accordance with Article 15(1).’ 
The only exceptions provided in the proposal (article 15) are directed at securing 
national interests:  
‘Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the 
rights and obligations provided for in Article 5, Article 6, Article 8(1) to (4), 
and Article 9 of this Directive when such restriction constitutes a necessary 
measure to safeguard national security, defence, public security, the 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of 
unauthorised use of the electronic communication system, as referred to in 
Article 13(1) of Directive 95/46/EC [the original Data Protection Directive].’ 
This brings us back to the ambiguity of international law – for every rule there is an 
exception, and the mere existence of a rule does not necessarily mean the enforcement 
of said provision. But as international law is the rule of states, this means that in the 
particular instance of the ePrivacy proposal, the balance is tipped in favour of the rights 
and interests of citizens instead of corporations. 
Additionally, the Commission was concerned with software and hardware that allowed 
for automated and invisible processing of data and the possibility of automatically 
collected data being made available to third parties (ePrivacy Proposal, 2000, 6). The 
Commission noted that some software used for Internet communication was not 
compatible with data protection rules. To minimize the damages this might cause, the 
Commission issued that providers of telecommunications had a duty to ensure 
confidentiality and the security of their networks (ePrivacy Proposal, 2000, 6).  
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Another matter of significant importance was the emergence of location based services. 
As mobile phones became more popular, operators were suddenly able to track their 
customers with great accuracy. Similarly, IP addresses also allowed websites to pinpoint 
Internet users with some degree of accuracy (usually only limited to the city from which 
they were surfing, though). The Commission acknowledged the potential for location 
based services both for public services and economic interests, but underlined the need 
to take privacy aspects into account.   
‘[T]he capacity of processing very precise location data in mobile 
communications networks should not lead to a situation where mobile users are 
under permanent surveillance with no means to protect their privacy, other than 
not using mobile communications services at all.’ (ePrivacy proposal, 2000, 4) 
The Commission was sure to stress that location based services must always be an 
extended service aimed for the subscriber and not a condition for using communications 
services. The users should also be provided with ‘a simple means to temporarily deny 
processing of location data’ (ePrivacy proposal, 2000, 4). The Commission envisioned 
some exceptions, however: emergency services could derogate from this rule and the 
same could be done for the purpose of public and national security and even criminal 
investigations.    
With email gaining importance in both private and work-related communications the 
Commission also saw the need to regulate direct marketing communications (essentially 
to combat spam). The Commission was concerned with the fact that the European 
countries approached direct marketing differently: some advocated an opt-out approach, 
in which the users had to explicitly announce that they did not wish to receive direct 
marketing calls or emails, whereas other countries preferred the opt-in approach, 
according to which users had to explicitly announce that they were willing to receive 
marketing messages. The Commission saw this as a problem in the internal market – 
direct marketers in countries where the opt-in approach had been chosen could simply 
send their messages from a country which supported the opt-out approach, thus 
circumventing national legislation on the matter. The Commission proposed opt-in 
harmonization within the internal market (ePrivacy proposal, 2000, 5). 
As a Directive that aims to protect the data of citizens, users and consumers of Europe it 
should come as no surprise that this right creates certain obligations for 
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telecommunications and Internet businesses that can affect them negatively and make 
certain business models illegitimate. In the case of social media, for example, most 
companies make a profit by collecting as detailed information as possible about their 
users; borrowing a widely cited truth, ‘if you’re not paying for it, you’re the product.’ 
Creating legislation which hinders that sort of data retention makes it more difficult for 
Information Society service providers to conduct everyday business: the prohibition of 
surveillance (article 5), data can only be used to create value-added services for the user 
(article 6), opt-in is needed before marketing communication is initiated (article 13), the 
users should have the possibility to disable location tracking and anonymous data 
should be used when possible (article 9, see also recitals 8, 15, 17). Article 6 paragraph 
5, for example, reads as follows: 
‘Processing of traffic data … must be restricted to what is necessary for the 
purpose of such activities [e.g. providing a value added service or marketing of 
own services].’ 
It is clear that the lobbying activities of the Internet companies had little effect, or 
perhaps even the Internet companies themselves had not yet realized the potential of 
targeted marketing online. However that may be, the fact remains that these provisions 
make it more difficult for companies like Facebook and Google to operate in the 
European Union in relation to the United States which employs a weaker data protection 
regime.12 
In practice there is a simple way to circumvent the above provisions: the use of lengthy 
end-user license agreements (EULAs).13In this context, EULAs are agreements which 
consumers agree to when they install software to their computers. The agreements are 
often very long and easy to click through, meaning that it is highly probable that the 
consumer will skip through the document and accept it without properly familiarizing 
him- or herself with the contents of the binding agreement. The EULAs still have to 
follow local legislation and for this reason some provisions that are binding in the US 
might not be binding in the EU. The use of excessively long conditions of use contracts 
                                                 
12 See NBC technology correspondent Bob Sullivan’s (2006) article as part of the ‘Privacy Lost’ article 
series, for example.  
13 The Electronic Frontier Foundation has listed the most common end-user license agreement terms that 
may harm consumers on their website (Newitz, 2005).  
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by software and hardware companies and the ease by which these contracts can be 
accepted has in practice rendered much of the data protection provisions obsolete. 
Especially in the age of free mobile apps, this practice has intensified.14 
4.3.2 The Data Retention Directive 
As noted above, the only possible exception to the ePrivacy Directive would have to do 
with either national security or criminal offences. It is therefore hardly surprising that 
the legitimacy of the Data Retention Directive was built upon said exception. The 
political will for the Directive can largely be attributed to terrorism, however. Europe 
had just suffered attacks in both Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 (Data Retention 
Proposal, 2004, 2-3), and the Council felt that European law enforcement needed to be 
able to access traffic data.  The Data Retention Directive differs slightly from the other 
directives as it was initiated by the Council.  
Although the Council recognized that the Directive would have adverse effects on 
European data privacy and protection and that any interference must be proportionate, 
the Council clearly had a different view of what amounts to be proportionate and 
necessary than most other stakeholders. The European Council quickly drafted a 
framework decision which laid the foundation for the new regulation. According to the 
decision, communications data should be retained from 12 to 36 months and the 
member states had quite a large margin of appreciation to derogate from the rules in the 
framework (Data Retention Framework decision, article 4). 
After the Data Retention Framework decision the Commission was vested with the 
responsibility of drafting a Directive on the same subject.  
Essentially, the Data Retention proposal requires that telecoms and internet service 
operators retain traffic data on all their users. Article 3(1) states that  
‘By way of derogation to Articles 5, 6 and 9 of Directive 2002/58/EC, Member 
States shall adopt measures to ensure that data which are generated or 
processed by providers of publicly available electronic communications 
services or of a public communications network within their jurisdiction in the 
                                                 
14 The Finnish Data Protection Supervisor Reijo Aarnio has, for example, expressed his concern for how 
suppliers of mobile applications use and collect consumer data (Tuisku, 2012). 
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process of supplying communication services are retained in accordance with 
the provisions of this Directive.’ 
The derogation above refers to the ePrivacy Directive’s most fundamental articles: the 
prohibition of surveillance of communications data, that data stored should either be 
erased or made anonymous, and that location data may only be stored if it is used for 
rendering a value-added service to the consumer. The Data Retention proposal makes it 
clear that its legal basis stems from the derogations allowed for in Article 15 of the 
ePrivacy Directive and Article 13(1) of Directive 95/46/EC (the Data Protection 
Directive). As derogations were already allowed for in the Data Protection Directive 
and the ePrivacy Directive, the Data Retention Proposal actually provided more detailed 
provisions for how data could be retained and for what purposes. 
Article 3(2) reads as follows: 
‘Member States shall adopt measures to ensure that data retained in accordance 
with this Directive are only provided to the competent national authorities, in 
specific cases and in accordance with national legislation, for the purpose of 
the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of serious criminal 
offences, such as terrorism and organised crime [emphasis added].’ 
This clearly follows the same line of argumentation that was used to elevate the need of 
a Directive. It may be noted, however, that the serious criminal offences are, at least 
vaguely, defined and limited to terrorism and organized crime. The above was 
subsequently changed and edited so that “serious crime” meant whatever a Member 
State defined it as. In this instance the aim of the Commission was probably to limit the 
usage of data mining techniques by national law enforcement authorities, but its 
vagueness is still disconcerting. The lack of definition for serious crime is precisely 
what makes this Directive a threat against the right to privacy. 
Furthermore, the proposal does not aim to define when competent authorities may 
access the retained data or how. This means that it is extremely difficult to monitor what 
data is transmitted to the law enforcement authorities and what the law enforcement 
authorities uses the data for. Feiler (2010, 20) was concerned with the fact that there 
adequate measures to combat abuse by official authorities were not included in the Data 
Retention Directive and that public officials might use data mining techniques to scan 
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through the data of the entire population, searching for potentially “suspicious 
behaviour”, whatever that may be. Article 9 in the proposal does, however, stipulate that 
the Member States must submit statistics to the Commission on the data retained on a 
yearly basis.  
The proposal also presented results of a consultation process DG Information Society 
and DG Justice, Law and Security conducted in 2004. The results showed that law 
enforcement authorities wanted the retention time to be as long as possible and that it 
should comprise as much data as necessary (Data Retention Proposal, 2004, 4). 
Telecommunications and Internet industry representatives held, however, that data 
retention was a major cost and that the retention period should be limited to six months 
for this reason.  
Data protection authorities and civil rights associations argued that since data retention 
is an interference with the private lives of citizens, the retention period should be as 
short as possible and questioned whether data from over six months back could be 
considered proportional (Data Retention Proposal, 2004, 4-5). They also wanted the 
retention time to be specified and a clearer explanation of how the data would be used. 
From the above summary of opinions it is easy to see differences in the discourse. The 
law enforcement agencies embark on the traditional arguments used in international law 
for trumping human rights: national security. Telecoms, however, argue that data 
retention is bad for business – human rights are not mentioned. Finally, data protection 
authorities and civil rights associations take the discussion back to the classic standards 
for determining righteousness: proportionality and necessity. 
In the end, the Commission settled for what they called a balanced approach, which 
meant that one year of retention from the date of communication was seen as sufficient, 
with the exception of online communications, which were to be retained for six months. 
Eventually, the Data Retention Directive provided for some margin of discretion, as the 
minimum time would be six months and maximum time two years – the precise time 
was for the states to decide, and no distinction was made between Internet and other 
electronic communications (Data Retention Directive, article 6). In this question the 
Commission adopted a more moderate approach than the Council had opted for. 
It is clear that the Commission, to some extent, wanted to limit to what uses the retained 
data could be put. Article 4 defines the categories of data that were to be retained: 
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‘Member States shall ensure that the following categories of data are retained 
under this Directive:  
(a) data necessary to trace and identify the source of a communication;  
(b) data necessary to trace and identify the destination of a communication;  
(c) data necessary to identify the date, time and duration of a communication;  
(d) data necessary to identify the type of communication;  
(e) data necessary to identify the communication device or what purports to be 
the communication device;  
(f) data necessary to identify the location of mobile communication 
equipment.’ 
The same provisions applied to both telephones and internet communication, meaning 
that, for example, the sender of an email and the recipient of an email have to be 
identified and the information retained.  
The data protection authorities posed a relevant question, however: how do we know 
that the data retained actually combats terrorism and organized crime? True, locations 
and phone calls can be tracked, but no content can be retained. This means that potential 
criminals could easily circumvent the retention, by using online chats and web forums 
for instance. As was already elevated in the presentation on previous research on the 
subject, Feiler (2010, 20), noted that this particular pitfall makes the Directive highly 
ineffective and reduces the public interest, as it creates an imbalance due to the loss of 
the right to privacy. 
In addition, the lack of definition of serious crime is worrisome. Since the data is 
already retained, all it takes is that the definition for when the data can be used is 
changed slightly. The Commission has already tried to make copyright infringing file-
sharing a criminal offence, for example. With seemingly minor amendments to the Data 
Retention Directive, national legislation or the copyright directives the retained data 
could be used for data mining operations with the purpose of finding file-sharers, 
effectively creating a situation where all Internet communications in Europe are 
monitored by law enforcement. Even present day legislation raises concerns, as there is 
no definition of when or how law enforcement may request the retained data, other than 
that it should be in accordance with national legislation – no court order is required by 
EU law, although national law might require it.  
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4.3.3 The ePrivacy Proposal and Data Retention Proposal compared 
Although concerned with the same policy area, the ePrivacy Proposal and the Data 
Retention Proposal are fundamentally different. On one point they are similar, however: 
co- and self-regulation has a very minimal role in both documents. The main goal with 
the ePrivacy Proposal was, however, to limit businesses from abusing personal data or 
sending unsolicited communications, so it is not that surprising that the Commission did 
not see industry self-regulation as a good way of ensuring Europeans of their data 
protection rights. National security and self-governance are not compatible ideas, and so 
it is only natural that the Data Retention Proposal only included the telecommunications 
sector to the extent that cooperation was necessary. 
Although the same entity had the main drafting responsibility, namely DG Information 
Society and Media, the two documents approach data protection completely differently. 
The Data Retention saw the light of day since European leaders were shocked by terror 
attacks, no doubt also affected by the 9/11 terror attacks in New York. In other words, 
the Data Retention Proposal is a proposal for a Directive which first and foremost takes 
the nation state into account, not the competitiveness of European businesses. The 
ePrivacy Proposal, on the other hand, updated the outdated Data Protection Directive 
with more specific guidelines on how businesses should conduct their day to day 
activities in a modern online environment – in that sense, the ePrivacy Proposal’s 
primary concern was the citizen’s right to privacy. As such, the two directives represent 
the public interest on opposed sides of the scale: one aims to protect the public interest 
by increasing surveillance and thus reducing privacy and data protection, while the 
other tries to safeguard those same rights.  
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4.4 The Commission’s take on IPR enforcement 
4.4.1 IPRED 1 & 2 
The first proposal for IPRED was presented for the Parliament and the Council by the 
Commission in January, 2003.  The purpose of the proposal is to supplement the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), as the 
Commission regarded it to be too limited in terms of enforcement rights (IPRED1 
proposal, 2003, 13). It is based on the Green Paper on Combating Counterfeiting and 
Piracy in the Single Market from 1998 and a follow-up Communication to the Green 
Paper from 30 November, 2000. The Green Papers were largely based on a consultation 
of ‘interested circles.’15 The DG primarily responsible for the Directive was DG Internal 
Market and Services, and was ultimately approved by the Council and Parliament by 
co-decision in 2004 (European Commission, 2012).   
The Directive is, naturally, also concerned with counterfeiting and pirated goods, which 
have few touching points with the Internet, but the Internet is still raised as a point of 
issue. What is perhaps surprising is that the Directorate-General on Information Society 
was not involved in the process, even though the increased use of the Internet for 
copyright infringing activities is cited as one of the more pressing problems (IPRED1 
proposal, 2003, 3, recital 9). The Directive is still the most important piece of European 
legislation related to enforcing copyright on the web. It has been criticized for its 
overreaching nature by organizations such as La Quadrature du Net and the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation.  One of the goals with the Directive was to address the disparity of 
legal rules and create a single basis for enforcing intellectual property rights within the 
European Union (IPRED1 proposal, 2003, 3). In other words, the Commission 
attempted to create a harmonized regulatory framework within the union.  
Parts one to three of the proposal present the background and the motivations behind the 
proposal, while part four presents the actual provisions, along with an explanation of the 
contents of each article. I will first raise some points elevated by the Commission in 
parts one through three, but the actual analysis is concerned with the provisions in part 
four. Although the Directive’s primary goal is intellectual property rights enforcement, 
                                                 
15 I have not yet been able to find a list of participants. The link cited in the proposal no longer works, and 
the earliest consultations listed on the Commission’s website date back to 2001. 
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it also recognizes another Directive drafted by the same DG, the e-Commerce Directive, 
by stating that obligations made on Internet intermediaries should not be ‘excessively 
heavy’ and access to the Internet and the free movement of information shall not be 
made too costly or difficult (IPRED1 proposal, 2003, 8).  
The audio-visual industry is cited as one of the big losers in the digital era. According to 
the Commission, it is ‘particularly under threat from piracy’ and the industry’s self-
assessment of their losses amounted to 4.5 billion euro annually (IPRED1 proposal, 
2003, 10). Consumer protection is also raised as a major concern; for example, the 
Commission withholds that counterfeiting, piracy and even infringements of intellectual 
property have ‘pernicious consequences for consumers’ (IPRED1 proposal, 2003, 11). It 
is clear that the Commission is referring to physical products in this instance, as it is 
hard to see how a digital copy of the original product could raise concerns such as the 
consumer being “cheated” or receiving a product of poorer quality. The health-related 
concerns are primarily related to copyright for medicine.  
Some clarification might be needed at this stage. The terms counterfeiting and piracy 
are mostly used when discussing physical products and traditionally they refer to 
commercial activity. Copyright infringement does, however, not. Bearing this in mind, 
file-sharing, for example, is rather treated as copyright infringement and not piracy, 
although the popularization of the term “online piracy” has made this distinction 
difficult to maintain. 
It becomes clear that although losses of the audio-visual industry were cited as one of 
the largest threats, the proposal for IPRED1 is mostly concerned with physical goods 
rather than digital ones. Most of the provisions are completely useless in an online 
environment, and those which are not are downright dangerous from a privacy and 
freedom of expression perspective, and would clearly violate proportionality principles 
if applied to copyright infringing file-sharing, for example. For example, the right to 
obtain information about people involved in the infringement process is impossible for 
regular users to comply with, as file-sharers seldom have any idea of the other file-
sharers’ identities.  
Although Recital 2 maintains that protection of intellectual property must not ‘hamper 
freedom of expression or the free movement of information’ and that it must allow the 
widest dissemination of works and ideas, few articles support this goal. The biggest 
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problems lie within the provisions stipulating provisional and precautionary measures, 
damages and criminal law.  
The provisional measures are problematic in the sense that the potential censorship of 
websites is not a result of a judicial process, but done at the request of a rights holder. 
According to article 10, judicial authorities may serve the intermediary an interlocutory 
injunction to prevent infringement without the defendant being heard. Part of the 
problem is that sites may have as much legal content on them as copyright infringing 
content – in other words, it could have adverse effects on the freedom of expression. 
Here it depends, of course, on the scope – if, as with the case of YouTube, a single 
video needs to be removed, it can hardly be called a threat to the freedom of expression. 
If, on the other hand, a whole site is closed down, such as Megaupload,16 this is a real 
concern. 
Determining damages is difficult when it comes to file-sharing. Article 17(1) states that 
prejudiced party shall be awarded 
‘a) either damages set at double the royalties or fees which would have been 
due if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the intellectual property 
right in question; 
b) or compensatory damages corresponding to the actual prejudice (including 
lost profits) suffered by the right holder as a result of the infringement.’ 
The “lost profits” clause contains multiple pitfalls. First, how do you define lost profits? 
Can you attribute all losses to illegal file-sharing, for example? Is the amount of times a 
file is shared equivalent to the amount of products that would have been sold? How is 
responsibility determined – the amount of times a user has uploaded a file in its entirety, 
or the amount of users the file-sharer has shared parts of the file to, or the full amount of 
users who have downloaded the file? File-sharers use, in most cases, a so-called torrent 
technique, which means that a file is divided into several different packets. The file-
sharers then download different packets from different users. Essentially, this means 
that one user seldom uploads a whole file to another, but simply fragments of it.  
                                                 
16 Megaupload was a file-hosting service that was known for hosting user-submitted copyright infringing 
material. The site was shut down by the United States Department of Justice on 19 January, 2012. 
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All in all, a file-sharer might share parts of the file to thousands of users, but the file 
would only be uploaded two times in its entirety. Usually it is the plaintiff who gets to 
determine how much they lost on the infringement, and their interpretation of this issue 
is likely to be very biased. Although the courts usually do not grant the amount of 
damages the plaintiff requests, the sums have been extraordinary high in file-sharing 
cases. For example, in the US, the Supreme Court let stand a $675,000 file-sharing 
damages award that a jury levied a college student who had shared 30 songs on the p2p 
file-sharing network Kazaa (Kravets, 2012). In Europe the damages have been more 
moderate but nevertheless substantial. In Belgium a man was ordered to pay 65,651 
euros in damages for illegally uploading 1,127 files containing copyright protected 
content (van der Veen, 2012). 
The criminal law provisions were eventually exempt from IPRED 1, but the 
Commission has in every subsequent proposal tried to re-include them. According to 
article 20(1), all ‘serious infringements of an intellectual property right … are treated as 
criminal offences.’ This is problematic in view of the definition provided on what 
constitutes a serious infringement, as stated in Recital 25: 
‘To this end, “serious infringement” means acts which are carried out 
intentionally and for commercial purposes. All or some of those participating 
in the infringement or attempted infringement, should be declared responsible, 
according to the particular country’s internal law, as accomplices or 
instigators.’ 
The vagueness of the definition means that, in effect, file-sharers could be imprisoned 
for their actions. The commercial degree of the activity is completely dependent on the 
definition – is it for commercial purposes that someone downloads a file? File-sharers 
might not make money out of it, but one could argue that acquiring and disseminating 
the product for free is a commercial purpose in and of itself.   
In addition, article 20(3) also provides the following sanction  
‘in appropriate cases … total or partial permanent or temporary closure of the 
establishment used primarily to commit the infringement;’  
If applied to the online environment, this could potentially mean censoring large parts 
of the Internet.  
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As stated above, the Parliament and the Council did not include the criminal provisions 
in the final document. The Commission was persistent in this respect, however. In 2005 
they submitted a proposal for supplementing IPRED 1: a Proposal for a Directive on 
criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights, or 
IPRED 2. The Proposal was drafted only one year after IPRED 1 entered into force in 
2004, but IPRED 2 is yet to be approved by the Parliament. That being said, the 
Commission was clearly not happy to see the criminal provisions removed from IPRED 
1 and tried to reinstate those provisions in IPRED 2. According to the Commission 
(IPRED 2, 2005, 2), ‘there are high potential profits to be made without risk of serious 
legal penalties’ and ‘criminal penalties also constitute, in appropriate cases, a means of 
enforcing intellectual property rights.’ In Recital 2 the Commision states that 
 ‘A sufficiently dissuasive set of penalties applicable throughout the 
Community is needed to make the provisions laid down in this Directive 
complete.’ 
The penalties are very similar in the two proposals, but the definition of what constitutes 
a criminal offence is slightly different. IPRED 1 article 20(1) states as follows: 
‘Member States shall ensure that all serious infringements of an intellectual 
property right, as well as attempts at, participation in and instigation of such 
infringements, are treated as a criminal offence. An infringement is considered 
serious if it is intentional and committed for commercial purposes.’ 
Following the same line of thought, IPRED 2 article 3 states that 
‘Member States shall ensure that all intentional infringements of an intellectual 
property right on a commercial scale, and attempting, aiding or abetting and 
inciting such infringements, are treated as criminal offences.’ 
In IPRED 2, the Commission has decided to exclude the separation between “serious 
infringement” and other infringements, but the definition is essentially included in the 
wording by reference to intentional infringements on a commercial scale. The question 
becomes whether there is a difference between “commercial purposes” and 
“commercial scale”. Some might argue that the two are synonymous. One could, 
however, find different nuances of meaning in the two. Commercial purposes indicate 
that the intention behind the infringement is commercial. Commercial scale, however, 
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does not indicate that the commercial scale has been a goal in itself, only that it is the 
end result of the infringement. True, both are, according to the definition, intentional, 
but even though the infringement might be intentional, it does not mean that the 
resulting commercial activity was. Truthfully, a difference between the two might not 
exist, but it points out the problem with using “commercial scale” as a definition for a 
criminal offence while failing to define what commercial scale means, which could 
mean that it would be impossible to distinguish between a teenager sharing Madonna’s 
new single online and someone selling fake Louis Vuitton bags for a profit. 
4.4.2 ACTA 
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement is an international agreement between the 
Member states of the European Union and 12 other states, which means that there are 39 
parties to the agreement. The idea behind ACTA (2011, 2) is to complement the 1994 
TRIPS Agreement to combat piracy and copyright infringement in the 21st century more 
efficiently. In order to meet this goal, there is a section specially devoted for the 
‘enforcement of intellectual property rights in the digital environment’ (ACTA, 2011, 
32). The agreement has been widely criticized by several European MEPs and the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (among other organizations) for numerous reasons, most 
notably because the negations were very secretive in nature, and that an agreement 
which was supposed to be about counterfeit products actually had grave consequences 
for the regulation of the Internet (Katz, 2009).  
Marietje Schaake, a Dutch MEP from the party D66, was one of the loudest protesters 
in the European Parliament. In a speech from July 3rd, 2012 Schaake (2012) expressed 
that  
‘ACTA is the symbol of closed politics, of non-transparent back-door decisions 
of the pre-Lisbon era, and of hampering instead of embracing digital freedom. 
It is time to say goodbye to ACTA but – this rejection comes with 
responsibilities. We need to complete the EU’s digital single market, for which 
we desperately need copyright reform, not the enforcement of 27 different 
systems. We need sector-specific approaches to counterfeiting: a bag is not a 
movie. Tangible goods are scarce; digital contact exists increasingly in 
abundance and we cannot enforce counterfeit goods the same way as we do 
digital content, not without violating fundamental rights or other collateral 
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damage. Internet service providers are not music police. Let us foster more 
legal content instead.’ 
The European Parliament has also criticized the agreement and the lack of transparency 
of the negotiations in a resolution from March, 2010, and pointed out that the 
Parliament will have to give its consent to the treaty before it enters into force in the EU 
(European Parliament, 2010). ACTA was officially rejected by the European Parliament 
on July 4th, 2012 with 478 votes against the agreement, 39 in favour and 165 abstained 
(European Parliament, 2012). The European Court of Justice will still decide whether 
ACTA is compatible with EU law, as the Commission decided to ask the ECJ to rule on 
the legality of the agreement (Lee, 2012). ACTA clearly lacked public support and 
many civil society organizations and concerned citizens encouraged the MEPs to vote 
against the agreement. 
Finding out whether or not the agreement is compatible with EU law is not the purpose 
of this study, however. What is interesting to see is how the Commission, which 
represented the EU in the negotiations (Europa.eu, 2010), decided to weigh the interests 
of other parties, such as Internet service providers, media producers and consumers. As 
the Commission was highly involved in the negotiations, it is fair to assume that the 
Commission’s view is represented in ACTA, even though the Commission was not 
solely responsible for the drafting of the agreement. 
In the introduction of the agreement, the parties state that they desire to 
 ‘address the problem of infringement of intellectual property rights, including 
infringement taking place in the digital environment, in particular with respect 
to copyright or related rights, in a manner that balances the rights and interests 
of the relevant right holders, service providers, and users’ (ACTA, 2011, 2, 
emphasis added). 
For the purpose of analysis I have decided to equate rights holders with media content 
and software producers and publishers, copyright collectives (such as performance 
rights organizations) and the original creator of the media or software product. The 
scope of the agreement is of course much wider, but these are the actors which are 
mostly concerned with consumer products. Second, service providers are equated with 
hosting service providers and ISPs. The third group, users, primarily indicates 
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consumers of copyright materials, but I have decided to include copyright infringers as 
well.  
Now it should come as no surprise that the agreement represents the interests of rights 
holders; no matter how you spin it, the audio-visual industry clearly benefits from this 
agreement. Therefore it is interesting to see to what extent the “balancing act” is 
effective.  
Take for example article 8, paragraph 1, which states what injunctions should be 
available: 
‘Each Party shall provide that … its judicial authorities have the authority to 
issue an order … where appropriate, to a third party over whom the relevant 
judicial authority exercises jurisdiction, to prevent goods that involve the 
infringement of an intellectual property right from entering into the channels of 
commerce.’ 
In the world of the web this might mean numerous things: that an ISP should deter its 
users access to certain websites; that producers of peer-to-peer software should install 
filters for the transfer of copyright material; that domain providers should shut down 
websites, and so forth. The problem with applying this article to the digital environment 
is that the web is completely dependent on intertextuality and user submitted material. 
Take, for example, YouTube. YouTube is filled with illegally uploaded copyright 
material. Sometimes a music video is uploaded directly, in other cases someone has 
used another artist’s song as a background track and sometimes a user has decided to do 
their own version of a song without paying the songwriter royalties. It goes without 
saying that trying to filter all of these varieties of copyright infringement is impossible. 
Another issue with this particular paragraph is that it does not define more clearly on 
what level the injunction may be made.  
Continuing with the YouTube example, if a party to the agreement finds that one of its 
nationals’ songs is illegally uploaded on the site, which third party should be issued an 
order? Bearing in mind that the judicial authorities can only issue an order over a third 
party over whom it exercises jurisdiction, and therefore cannot touch YouTube directly 
(unless the party in question is the United States) this means that, in theory, the national 
courts could order that the ISP should block access to YouTube. The odds of this 
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occurring to YouTube is of course, quite unlikely, but other less-known and less-
popular sites run by lesser companies than Google could be affected.  
As mentioned above, section 5 of the agreement is devoted to the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in the digital environment. Although article 27 clearly states 
that enforcement procedures presented in other parts of the agreement should also be 
available in the digital environment (ACTA, 32), there are a couple of specialized 
articles and paragraphs related to the effective governance of the net. One difference is 
that this section clearly underlines the need to preserve ‘fundamental principles such as 
freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy’ (ACTA, art. 27, para. 2).  
The reference to freedom of expression indicates that intellectual property rights work 
differently online, and that combating copyright infringements might also affect the 
freedom of expression negatively. The Parliament’s resolution addressed the same 
issue. There is, however, no indication of how these principles should be preserved in 
practice, and no clear safeguards exist, either. The balancing act is therefore limited to 
acknowledging possible issues in this instance.  
Corporations that might be affected by the enforcement procedures are also protected in 
a similar way, as  
‘[t]hese procedures shall be implemented in a manner that avoids the creation 
of barriers to legitimate activity, including electronic commerce, and, 
consistent with that Party's law, preserves fundamental principles such as 
freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy' (ACTA, art. 27, para. 2).  
A footnote clarifies that even though a regime provides limitations to the liability of 
online service providers, the interests of the rights holder must still be preserved. There 
is only one specific measure related to ISP liability, concerning when ISPs can be 
ordered to disclose user information to a rights holder. According to article 27, 
paragraph 4,  
‘A Party may provide … its competent authorities with the authority to order 
an online service provider to disclose expeditiously to a right holder 
information sufficient to identify a subscriber whose account was allegedly 
used for infringement’  
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This practice has already been implemented in a number of countries, but the difference 
is that this would make it lawful to disclose information directly to the rights holder, i.e. 
a private entity. Presently, this is not legal under European laws on data protection 
(ECJ, 2008, para. 123). In this particular instance the Commission clearly supports a 
narrower protection of data protection rights and privacy to protect intellectual property 
rights.  This indicates a wish for a major policy shift in the European Union as well, as 
ACTA would to some extent extend hierarchical governance rights to private actors in 
matters related to the Internet. In a similar vein, paragraph 3 states that ‘Each Party shall 
endeavour to promote cooperative efforts within the business community to effectively 
address trademark and copyright or related rights infringement.’ This also indicates that 
the Commission is willing to grant private actors Internet content governance powers. 
How far these “cooperative efforts” will extend is unknown, but concerns have been 
raised by the European Data Protection Supervisor, for example (See Hustinx, 2010).  
The above-mentioned issues with ACTA are primarily related to questions where there 
has been an actual infringement and what the responsibilities of third parties are in such 
cases. They affect the data protection and privacy of individuals, and possibly affect 
ISPs’ and server providers’ businesses negatively (or at least complicate matters an 
awful lot). But ACTA goes further than this, possibly challenging the way people 
interact online and the principle which makes up the foundation for the Internet: sharing 
information. According to article 23, criminal procedures and penalties for 
counterfeiting or copyright infringement on a commercial scale should be available. 
This provision is not out of the ordinary, but applying the definition of commercial scale 
to the Internet is problematic:  
‘For the purposes of this Section, acts carried out on a commercial scale 
include at least those carried out as commercial activities for direct or indirect 
economic or commercial advantage.’  
The problem with this is that ‘indirect economic or commercial advantages’ is a very 
vague definition in a world where even Facebook likes can be measured as a 
“commercial advantage”. Is it an indirect commercial advantage that you have views on 
your YouTube channel because you uploaded a Michael Jackson song on your account? 
This, in combination with paragraph 4 that states that the ‘Party shall ensure that 
criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available under its law’, also makes a person 
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sharing the link to an illegally uploaded Michael Jackson video criminally liable. On a 
similar note, in the process of examining the need for IPRED 2, Agarwal (2010, 810) 
also points out that ‘by not specifying the extent to which an alleged infringer must reap 
a commercial advantage for the term “commercial scale” to apply, consumers could 
face criminal sanctions for acts such as downloading music or movies’.  
Another interesting detail is that paragraph 3 provides that ‘[a] Party may provide 
criminal procedures and penalties in appropriate cases for the unauthorized copying of 
cinematographic works from a performance in a motion picture exhibition facility 
generally open to the public’, or in plain language, you can be brought to court for 
recording a movie with a video camera at the cinema. This is clearly an attempt to 
combat the file-sharing of illicit recordings of films on the Internet, but the interesting 
part is that when talking about counterfeit products, the crime is the connection to a 
commercial activity. Here the simple act of recording a film becomes a criminal act, 
whether or not the unauthorized copying is performed to make money out of the copy. 
In the light of these findings, it becomes clear that ACTA in many ways challenges the 
current Internet climate in Europe and data protection in the region. In its goal of trying 
to adapt copyright enforcement to the digital environment, the ACTA negotiations seem 
to have produced an agreement which instead of providing more detailed guidelines 
created a set of rules so ambiguous that even regular Internet use may be deemed illegal. 
Although many have raised concerns on how ACTA will affect the fundamental rights 
and freedoms as presented in the European Charter of Human Rights, few have 
explicitly outlined the problematic parts of the agreement.  
Granting that this research has shown some potential legal problems with ACTA (such 
as its compatibility with EU data protection law), the primary purpose of this paper is to 
examine the Commission’s take on Internet content governance, and here specifically, 
intellectual property rights enforcement in a digital environment. As the findings clearly 
show, ACTA has made meagre attempts of trying to balance the interests of rights 
holders, citizens of the European Union and service providers. The balance is clearly 
tipped in favour of the rights holders. For Internet users ACTA poses a threat to their 
data protection, for ISPs ACTA would mean more administrative costs (and probably 
legal fees) as increased cooperation with rights holders would be required.  Second, the 
Commission shows increasing support for private governance of the Internet, as it 
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underlines the role of private entities in enforcing intellectual property rights. Although 
some private entity involvement is absolutely necessary when it comes to the Internet 
(as most Internet and hosting service providers are privately owned), ACTA would even 
grant rights holders the possibility to receive information about the ISPs’ customers 
when an infringement is suspected. Although a court order would be needed, this is a 
clear deviation from EU data protection policy. 
4.4.3 Comparing ACTA and IPRED 
One of the more disquieting trends visible in the Commission’s efforts to regulate 
copyright infringement is that there seems to be few attempts to include opinions from 
actors specifically concerned with data protection and privacy. IPRED 1, for one, was 
primarily drafted by the Directorate-General for the Internal Market – as ACTA to a 
large extent repeats many of the provisions stated in IPRED, the same can probably be 
said about the international agreement. Another area of concern lies in that fact that few 
efforts are made to distinguish between file-sharing and counterfeiting and piracy. In the 
IPRED proposal, for example, although clearly meant to also address issues of illegal 
online distribution of software and media, no reference to the Internet or Internet service 
providers are made in the actual provisions.  
From the analysis of these three documents it becomes clear that applying intellectual 
property rights legislation on file-sharing is a poor way to tackle the problem. The 
definitions are not clear enough, the articles in the proposals are poorly applicable, and 
there seems to be a fundamental lack of understanding of how Internet file-sharing 
works. The only feasible solution would be having a separate set of rules for file-sharing 
which is not aimed at making a profit but simply (illegally) disseminate copyright 
content. File-sharing is happening on such a large scale that young people all over 
Europe could be treated as criminals. File-sharing could be compared to mass civil 
disobedience, not criminal activities; equating illegal file-sharing with wide-ranging 
criminal activities and the production of counterfeit goods greatly distorts why file-
sharing is happening and what effects it has on society. Defining file-sharing as civil 
disobedience is, of course, not in the interest of the audio-visual industry. For the 
industry, and copyright collectives, equating file-sharing with criminal activities works 
(allegedly) as a deterrent, regardless of how well suited the legal instruments are for 
combating online piracy.  
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5 From encouragement to surveillance 
5.1 Three ages of Internet governance 
5.1.1 The age of ICT competitiveness 
The last two decades have brought with them remarkable changes in the 
communications sector in Europe. Technological innovations changed the media sphere 
completely: from a situation where different mediums were clearly separated by 
technology, an era of convergence has evolved where essentially all media texts can 
coexist on the same platform. The challenge of regulating this new media landscape lies 
partly in developing the legislation towards a common legal framework, although the 
different strands of media regulation have been created separately and are thus not 
completely compatible. Another major challenge is that this new medium, the Internet, 
is as much of a medium as it is an infrastructure. Legislation which regulates the 
infrastructure effectively also affects how it develops as a medium.  
Ever since the Internet started to gain ground in Europe, the Commission has made 
efforts to guide its development. The proposed directives analyzed above can be divided 
into three categories: e-commerce, data protection and copyright. The division is not 
simply practical and does not merely represent different priorities of the Commission, 
rather, it expresses an ideological shift. Koskenniemi’s argument, that the system (or an 
institution) supports ideas and solutions that are closest to its own values and mission, 
clearly applies to the Commission. The Commission was initially established to 
strengthen the Single Market, to create a harmonized economic union. Even though the 
EU has evolved into a political union through the Lisbon treaty, which granted the 
Commission powers to draft legislation on other areas than the economic, the 
ideological mindset of the institution is less susceptible to change. What is susceptible 
to change, however, is what the Commission sees as the best way to strengthen the EU’s 
economic power.  
I evinced in chapter three that even though the Commission is clearly guided by 
economic motives, this does not tell us what implications this has on a more practical 
level. Napoli’s theoretical model which divides concepts into three levels, a conceptual 
level, an operational level and an applicational level, is instrumental in illustrating how 
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one can see the Commission’s bias. On a conceptual level, it is structural. The 
Commission’s primary agenda is to advance the union’s economic prowess, to make 
sure that the EU can compete with other economic superpowers. How this goal should 
be pursued changes from time to time, however. This brings us to the operational level, 
which establishes the principles for achieving the top-level goal.  
Michalis (2007, 191) explained in her study how the 90s where characterized by an era 
of competitiveness. Essentially, the EU was afraid of being left at the station while the 
US cashed in on the emerging ICT sector. As a result, the telecom sector was 
deregulated to encourage development of Internet infrastructure. On the operational 
level, the deregulation of the telecom sector and support for small and medium sized 
ICT businesses were established as the guiding principles. On a practical level, or 
application level, this guided the regulatory efforts and thus created the e-Commerce 
Directive.  
The e-Commerce Directive was drafted to create an encouraging environment for 
software companies. Hosting service providers and ISPs were exempt from liability, 
electronic contracts were clarified and the Commission tried to encourage companies to 
come up with self-regulatory measures that would increase consumer confidence in the 
ICT sector. In other words, the Commission aimed at supporting both the infrastructure 
and the content providers. The ISPs were exempt from monitoring duties, while hosting 
service providers were ensured that they need not worry about the content that was 
stored on their servers. It is doubtful whether the endorsement ofto self-regulatory 
mechanisms was an actual encouragement or if it was more about acknowledging the 
self-regulatory measures that already existed. Marsden (2010, 1-5) points out that the 
ICT sector largely started to self-regulate before European legislators had looked at the 
governance issue. One could therefore argue that the e-Commerce Directive simply 
expressed the Commission’s support for the industry’s established practices.  
At this stage, few thought of the implications the Internet might have on the audio-
visual industry – it was, quite clearly, more important to make sure that the ICT sector 
in Europe had the best possible outset for competing with the American industry. The 
general interest was in that sense seen as Europe being able to create their own, 
successful ICT sector which would provide jobs and prosperity. The amount of Internet 
users was growing quickly, and with it the potential of e-commerce. Between when the 
 76 
 
e-Commerce Directive was first proposed and when it was enacted the amount of 
Internet users more than doubled in the world, from 147M in December, 1998 to 361M 
in December, 2000 (Internet World Stats, 2012). The Commission can thus be blamed 
for not noticing the potential of the Internet at an earlier stage. 
5.1.2 The age of data protection 
In the beginning of the 21st century, Europe entered into a new age of communication 
governance. Although there was an economic incentive behind enacting the ePrivacy 
Directive, namely to combat spam and to make sure that consumers can trust 
corporations with their data, the Directive was most probably a counter-reaction to the 
fact that the e-Commerce Directive only saw users as consumers and not as citizens. It 
may be noted that it was DG Information Society that drafted the document, as opposed 
to the e-Commerce Directive which was drafted by DG Internal Market.  Of the 
documents analyzed in this thesis, the ePrivacy proposal is clearly the document which 
sees citizen’s rights, as opposed to economic interests, as the main point of concern. It 
also shows that the drafting body within the Commission matters a great deal: DG 
Internal Market and DG Connect (previously Information Society and Media) approach 
the Internet from different perspectives, creating a different foundation for rights and 
obligations to evolve. In other words, the principles laid down on the operational level 
can be differently applied on the applicational level depending on the DG that has the 
primary drafting responsibility. 
From initially being concerned with the competitiveness of the union and especially the 
ICT sector’s development, another area of concern emerged: security. Terrorist attacks 
in Madrid and London shook Europe, and governments in the EU member states started 
to look for ways to prevent similar attacks from happening again. Although the ePrivacy 
Directive made tracking and data surveillance illegal, it provided one notable exception: 
law enforcement, and especially in cases where the security of a state was at stake.  
Thus the Data Retention Directive saw the light of day.  
It must be underlined, however, that the Data Retention Directive was a Council 
initiative. The Council, essentially being an organ made out of national government 
representatives, wanted quite far-reaching data retention requirements. In fact, the 
Commission limited the extent of the Directive, probably out of fear that it might 
discourage the ISPs and possibly hamper innovation. This also shows that the 
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Commission was fundamentally concerned with economic questions, rather than 
security issues (which the Council, arguably, effectively oversaw). Even though the 
self-regulatory trend had already begun in Europe, the Data Retention Directive is a 
notable exception to that development. Although the telecoms had to accept the 
retention requirements cast upon them, industry self-regulation was not encouraged. 
Access to the retained data was effectively limited to law enforcement agencies, 
emphasizing the role of the nation state.  
In this sense the Data Retention Directive has more in common with security-related 
agreements than with Internet regulation – the role of private actors is minimized. This 
will probably also be the case in the future. In this instance, the question is how 
automatized the transfer of data from the ISPs to the law enforcement agencies is, a 
question which is, undeniably, solved differently in different nation states. The fear of 
data mining is real in cases where no court order is needed to access the retained data, 
and nothing in the Commission’s proposal points out that court orders are needed 
(although Member States might require them). This puts citizen’s right to privacy on the 
line.  Although the Directive harmonizes legislation, in that it makes it easier for 
multinational ISPs to follow the same retention principles throughout Europe, 
consumers have to have quite specific information on their country of residence’s 
conditions for turning over the retained data to law enforcement authorities.  
The lack of safeguards is disconcerting. The temptation to analyze data in order to find 
criminal patterns is great, even though the Directive’s initial purpose was to provide 
evidence when other sources indicated that a crime had been or was being committed. 
As there is no effective oversight of the law enforcement agencies, this means that 
potential privacy violations will go unnoticed. In other words, Europe entered an age of 
surveillance, something which the ePrivacy Directive, to a certain extent, had attempted 
to limit. The terrorist attacks justified a change in the public discourse, making 
surveillance not only technologically feasible but also politically acceptable. The claim 
Meyer and Van Audenhove (2010, 69-70) make that living in an information society 
means living in a surveillance society is only true to the extent that there is political will 
to allow for widespread surveillance. Data retention, as allowed for in the Directive, is 
by no means necessary for the Internet to function, but it is a nifty add-on.  
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As touched upon above, the terror attacks might even have generated some public 
support for the Directive – not unlike the Patriot Act in the US. But there has yet been 
little proof of the Directive’s effectiveness – does the Directive actually stop terror 
attacks from occurring?  As Wallace-Wells (2011) points out, the Patriot Act has mostly 
been used in drug investigations and not for the purpose which gave it public support. 
Terrorist attacks have, in other words, provided regulators with a convenient window of 
opportunity to pass legislation which affects privacy. Still, many would still see drug 
trade as enough of a reason to retain data, but would drugs have been enough to pass the 
Patriot Act, let alone the Data Retention Directive? This indicates that legislation which 
is passed under certain pretences will probably be put to other uses in the future. This is 
a question of fundamental importance when looking at the third age of internet 
governance – the age of IPR enforcement. 
5.1.3 The age of IPR enforcement 
In her study, Michalis (2007, 192) argued that in general, Internet infrastructure has 
been regulated on an EU level and content on a national level. While that may be the 
case, the fact remains that although legislation related to content exists, few realistic 
measures have been implemented to enforce said legislation. It is not until the last 
couple of years, with the emergence of graduate response sanctions, that nation states 
have made an active effort to combat illegal file-sharing, for example.  
The lack of enforcement provisions were not, however, caused by lack of political will 
on behalf of the Commission. Napster and then Kazaa, the pioneers of file-sharing 
software, made illegal sharing of copyright content mainstream in most of Europe and 
the US in the beginning of the 21st century. The recording industry quickly reacted to 
the new threat as they suffered first – Internet connections were still slow in the 
beginning of 2000, and mp3 files were small enough (3-4 Mb) to transfer on ISDN 
connections, capable of transferring 128 Kbps. Numerous lawsuits ensued, and industry 
lobbying efforts no doubt intensified. The IPRED proposal saw the light of day in 2003 
– this also shows that the ages of Internet governance overlap to a certain extent, as the 
Data Retention Directive was not enacted until a couple of years later. The fact that the 
Data Retention Directive was a Council initiative still indicates that the Commission’s 
primary focus related to Internet governance was enforcing copyright. 
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IPRED initially suggested that file-sharing should be categorized as a criminal offence. 
Although this was subsequently removed from the actual Directive, it shows what the 
Commission’s agenda is in this question. In IPRED 2, the Commission had included the 
same provision. ACTA, which was jointly drafted by the Commission, endorsed the 
same principle – one of the provisions that were also most heavily criticized by MEPs 
and civil society alike. 
By looking at the draft directives and ACTA one can clearly see that the Commission’s 
agenda has not changed in 10 years, even though it has faced a lot of criticism. This 
refusal to accept that public opinion is against the provision is fascinating, and one can 
all but deduce that big European media organizations and record labels are very 
influential in Europe. How far their influence reaches is of fundamental importance.  
 Making file-sharing a criminal offence could mean that enforcement of IPR could use 
exceptions in other directives to increase surveillance on the Internet. As noted above, 
the ePrivacy Directive made law enforcement an exception for tracking people and 
storing data. If file-sharing is a criminal offence, law enforcement could routinely track 
users to find copyright infringers. Taking it one step further, if the Data Retention 
Directive was amended so that it was used for all crime and not only serious crime, this 
could mean that the data retained for security purposes could be used to data mine for 
copyright infringements.  
Another point of concern is to the extent the Commission is willing to endorse co- and 
self-regulation in copyright enforcement. ACTA (2011, 4) evidently states that service 
providers and rights holders should cooperate to combat copyright infringement. This 
brings us to the question whether a fourth age of Internet governance is evolving in 
Europe, the age of IPR surveillance. 
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5.2 Towards an age of IPR surveillance? 
It is imperative to remember that IPR enforcement is actually quite simple from a 
technological perspective. Since all traffic passes through the ISPs they could, quite 
easily, monitor the stream of bits. Today, however, some torrent technologies (which is 
the most common file-transfer system used for illegal file-sharing) do encrypt the data 
that is transmitted. But being able to monitor the actual content is not even necessary to 
find file-sharers. The Data Retention Directive already obliges ISPs to monitor their 
subscribers’ traffic. Although not obliged to monitor the content that is transmitted, they 
can still see who their customers connect with and the amount of data that is being 
transmitted. Since websites provide the users with links to the torrent files, this means 
that a file-sharer could be identified in two simple steps: First, the ISP’s monitoring 
system would react every time a user is connected to a site which hosts torrent files. 
Although there are a few different sites available, there are not much more than 10 sites 
which are in active use. Second, the ISP’s monitoring system would react when a user 
downloads and uploads large amounts of data – movies and TV series are data-heavy 
and a user which downloads several movies a month can easily be identified. Third, the 
ISP would then submit this information to local authorities who would then decide 
whether or not this was sufficient evidence to conduct a search of the user’s computer. 
The third step would be made possible by making file-sharing a criminal offence.  
There is also another effective way of finding file-sharers, which does not even require 
the involvement of law enforcement authorities. Instead, the rights holders assume a 
more active role. The rights holders simply monitor file-sharers themselves by 
connecting to active torrents which share their copyright content – thanks to effective 
search engines it is incredibly easy to find the relevant torrents. When connected to the 
torrent network, the right holder can simply log every IP address they connect to. The 
rights holder then submits this information to the ISP which, depending on the approach 
taken, either submits the user information to the rights holder, who then proceeds by 
taking the matter to court, or through the graduated response mechanism, issues a 
warning or terminates the user’s Internet connection. This second way of combating 
file-sharing is actually already in place in Great Britain, Ireland and France where 
graduated response mechanisms are in place, although the government is also involved 
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– although it need not be. It may be noted that the European Data Protection Supervisor 
has criticized the graduated response measure, as elevated in chapter 2.2.1.  
The problem is thus not a lack of solutions, but a lack of political will, and to a certain 
extent also economic incentives. To begin with the economic disincentives, ISPs are 
reluctant to monitor their users for several reasons. First, it’s expensive. Retaining data 
is one thing, monitoring it actively requires investments in new technology which can 
weed out possible infringers. Second, monitoring is bad business. People generally do 
not want their communications to be monitored, regardless of what they are doing 
online. Third, and this is something that no ISP CEO would admit, ISPs capitalize on 
illegal file-sharing. The need for high-speed Internet connections (20 Mbps upwards) is 
based on file-transfers of considerable size. For all other use, a connection speed of 8 
Mbps or less is enough. Although legal alternatives for downloading movies, for 
example, are now available, there is no denying that illegal file-sharing amounts to a 
large percentage of the data transfers online – although there are no credible data 
available, it would be safe to assume that in 2012, illegal file-sharing amounts to a 
larger part of the traffic than legal downloading of movies and music. This has also to 
do with the fact that torrent technology requires users both to upload and download 
data, meaning that the total amount of data transmitted is doubled in comparison with 
traditional downloading where a user downloads a file from a server. As the amount of 
video streaming subscription services increase, this is likely to change, however.  
The economic disincentives also affect political will. The Data Retention Directive was 
enacted to protect national security, not copyright, and that it was initiated by the 
Council, and not the Commission. The ECJ clearly stated in its SABAM v SCARLET 
judgement that ISPs could not be obligated to monitor their users by reference to 
copyright enforcement. It should be noted, however, that the court primarily referred to 
the economic strain it would put on ISPs rather than the effect it would have on data 
privacy. However, in the Bonnier case from 2012 the court ruled that nothing in the 
Data Retention Directive precluded member states from enacting national legislation 
that could require ISPs to disclose IP addresses (which are required to be retained under 
the Data Retention Directive) to rights holders in civil legal proceedings. ISPs, the ICT 
sector, copyright collectives and media organizations simply have opposed views in this 
question.  
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Although media organizations and copyright collectives are very powerful in Europe, 
the success of the Commission’s Internet policies is more dependent on ISPs than media 
organizations such as Bertelsmann AG, Vivendi or News Corporation. The Commission 
has elevated the need for high-speed internet connections on more than one occasion, 
arguing that a widely spread, high-speed broadband infrastructure in Europe is 
necessary for maintaining EU’s competitiveness. Since ISPs are, to a large extent, 
privatized in the European Union, nation states and the Commission have to cooperate 
if they want to go through with the vision that by 2030, all Europeans should have 
access to high-speed broadband. Laying broadband infrastructure is expensive, and it 
might not be good business in all cases. Certain safeguards and subsidies must therefore 
be offered to the ISPs, and enforcing unpopular copyright enforcement policies would 
affect Commission and ISP relations negatively.  
At the same time, however, copyright collectives and media organizations are clearly 
dissatisfied with the present situation. The political will can be swayed if the losses of 
income based on file-sharing are suddenly beginning to seem too great. The 
Commission might well enact rules which enable the monitoring of users for the sake of 
copyright enforcement if a solution which is acceptable for the ISPs can be found. What 
if, for example, copyright collectives would pay for the development of IPR monitoring 
equipment? Media convergence can play a large role in this instance. More and more 
ISPs are offering copyright content to consumers, either via partnerships or by playing 
the part of the distributor.  
For example, TeliaSonera, the Finnish-Swedish telecom, has an extensive partnership 
agreement with Spotify, the music streaming service provider (O’Hear, 2010). By 
offering a premium Spotify account to its customers, the telecom hopes to gain a 
competitive advantage over other telecommunication companies in the region. 
Similarly, ISPs are offering video streaming services. Although the ISPs are not 
producers, the profitability of offering such services is dependent on enforcing 
copyright. After all, who is going to buy their monthly subscriptions if everyone is 
downloading the same content for free?  
Meyer and Van Audenhove (2010) expressed their concern for the opacity of different 
monitoring systems. It is worth noting that it is nigh impossible to monitor in what way 
the ISPs themselves use the data they have retained. There is at least some oversight 
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over law enforcement authorities as they are required to report when and for what 
purpose they need to access retained data. But ISPs with an incentive to monitor their 
own users are under no such public scrutiny. Similarly, mergers between telecoms and 
media organizations have similar effects. Such mergers have already taken place, 
exemplified by the merger between AOL and Time Warner in 2000 (The Learning 
Network, 2012).  
When telecommunications companies offer streaming services or even produce content 
themselves, the business logic changes. Suddenly, being able to offer value-added 
services to their customers becomes just as important as being able to guarantee the 
privacy of the customer’s communications. Effectively, encouraging co- and self-
regulation in copyright enforcement means less transparency and increased data privacy 
violations. ISPs with incentive to monitor their users’ traffic are most certainly effective 
copyright enforcers, but the question remains whether these corporations have the same 
incentive to safeguard data protection and privacy. 
The rules and tools needed for effective copyright enforcement are already in place; it is 
just that their scope is still limited so that they cannot be used for such purposes. If, 
however, copyright infringement became a criminal offence and the Data Retention 
Directive were extended to cover not only serious offences but also criminal offences, 
an effective copyright enforcement legal framework would already exist. The changes 
in wording might seem minor, but the effects are potentially immense. What it would 
require is for the Commission to enter into a fourth age of Internet governance, the age 
of IPR surveillance. In practice, it would mean encouraging cross-industry co-
regulation, as there were already signs of in ACTA, and modifying existent legislation 
that was drafted for security reasons to also apply to copyright enforcement. 
The Patriot Act example already showed how legislation justified by something 
initially, in that case terrorism, can be used in other areas (drug investigations) as well. 
If interests between ISPs and media organizations converge – and arguably, if the 
services they offer converge, this is also bound to happen – the Commission would have 
enough industry backing to re-draft the directives. Then the question would be whether 
civil society and software giants have enough political power to convince MEPs to vote 
against the proposals.  
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So what is the role the ICT sector plays then? One fundamental factor is that the 
dominant ICT companies are not European. This means that they have less political 
backing in Europe, as opposed to media organizations and especially telecoms, which 
have a lot of political support both nationally and within the European Union. The 
Commission is quite naturally less interested in creating a favourable position for 
Google than, say, Orange or TeliaSonera.  
The purpose of the e-Commerce directive was to create a more favourable position for 
start-ups within the ICT sector, not make it easier for American companies to penetrate 
the European market. The effects of the ePrivacy Directive are, however, mostly 
negative, if one looks at it from an ICT company’s perspective. Bearing in mind that the 
most influential ICT companies, such as Google and Facebook, are dependent on being 
able to process consumer information in order to be interesting for advertisers, any 
limitation on their ability to collect data makes business more difficult. If search engines 
or social media cannot collect specific data on their consumers, they cannot provide 
advertisers tailor-made deals on how to reach specific consumers by targeted 
advertising. Since this is the number one source of income for these ICT companies, 
prohibition to collect data would also mean less money for developing free, value-added 
services to end consumers.  
Sometimes value-added services and free apps come in sheep’s clothing, however. The 
Internet offers a lot of services for free in exchange for privacy. The Internet has in 
other words created a new economic system which circulates around a new form of 
currency, privacy. Consumers get services for free by supplying personal information – 
the information is then used either for advertisement or market analysis. A large number 
of mobile applications are available for free, but at the same time, they require that users 
submit detailed communication information – even allowing the application provider to 
record phone calls. It is very unclear how certain end-user license agreements that 
mobile applications use are compatible with European data protection legislation. Much 
in the same way as file-sharers circumvent site-blocking efforts and surveillance 
mechanisms, corporations have developed mechanisms with the purpose of avoiding 
data protection legislation. Indeed, as the Commission envisioned in its impact 
assessment for the ePrivacy proposal, businesses will have to adapt to the new 
legislation and that is also what they have done, but perhaps not in the manner which 
was envisioned by the Commission.  
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But ICT companies such as Google are also seeking to expand their activities. Google’s 
Android operating system is already used in 75% of all the smartphones sold on the 
market (Shen, 2012). This is much thanks to the fact that Google has tried to strike deals 
with as many Smartphone manufacturers as possible, meaning that Google has been 
able to penetrate local markets which are hard to access for outsiders. Android’s 
continued dominance is, however, highly dependent on their ability to provide value-
added services to consumers which are using Android smartphones. Not only does it 
mean developing their own operating system and pre-installed apps, but also creating a 
market which makes it lucrative for third-party software developers to make apps for 
consumers and sell them via Google Play, Google’s own application store. If these 
third-party apps are successful, it means Google is successful, as a third of all income 
falls in Google’s pocket (Google, 2012). The free third-party apps are also dependent on 
targeted advertising, which means that despite having created the dominant mobile OS, 
Google’s source of income can be traced back to practices which exploit data privacy. 
ICT companies oppose ACTA (or IPRED, or SOPA, or PIPA) not because the new 
legislation might infringe on the data privacy of citizens, but because the copyright 
enforcement legislation might weaken some of the safeguards given to hosting 
providers by the e-Commerce Directive. It is a question of responsibility, not data 
privacy. ICT companies want to turn a blind eye to file-sharing, unless, of course, they 
are software producers, and they most definitely do not want to be responsible for all 
the copyright infringing material that is available on their servers. YouTube, Google’s 
video streaming website, would not be as big as it is today, had it not provided a lot of 
copyright content in the form of music videos or clips from TV shows. 
For civil society to be able to influence regulators when they are drafting regulation on 
Internet governance, the question is not to what extent NGOs can elevate how new 
Internet regulation affects human rights, such as freedom of expression, the right to 
privacy and due process. As stated above, on a conceptual level, the Commission is 
biased towards developing the EU economically. To be able to sway operational 
principles, and in turn applicational ones, one therefore needs to address the questions 
of Internet governance from a competitiveness and economic feasibility point of view. 
This means that for civil society to succeed, it needs to side with different industries at 
different times to be able to influence European decision-makers. In questions of 
copyright enforcement, civil society should use the same arguments as the ICT sector 
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and argue that the proposed mechanisms hamper innovation and stifle ICT sector 
growth – arguments which the Commission used to justify the need for an e-Commerce 
Directive. In questions of data privacy and protection, civil society should stand behind 
Europe’s telecom industry that argues that monitoring is expensive and influences 
European competitiveness negatively. Public interest rarely coincides with copyright 
collective interests when it comes to copyright enforcement, however, but with media 
organizations it might. Media organizations may, for example, wish for an updated 
copyright legislation which allows them to disseminate programmes over national 
borders without extra costs. One can easily see how public service broadcasting might 
benefit from not having to pay for copyright licenses by region (reach), but instead by 
actual audience (share). 
Public interest and economic interest can therefore not be presented as opposites. 
However, it is important to note that while the interests might coincide, the motive 
behind a policy goal differs. Interestingly, the public interest can be protected by 
conflicting economic interests. But when economic interests convergence because of 
sector convergence, the public interest might become threatened. Presently, the 
protection of the public interest is dependent on ISPs and ICT companies having 
different economic incentives (or disincentives) than media organizations and copyright 
collectives. I would therefore dare argue that the Commission’s way of seeing the 
public interest is a combination (and a balancing act) of industry interests, which to a 
lesser or greater extent coincides with citizen public interest.  
The role of the DGs cannot be underplayed. The ePrivacy Proposal is undoubtedly a 
different kind of document than the other proposals. The slight deviation from the 
policy route is explained by the fact that DG Information Society looked at the question 
of data privacy from a different point of view than DG Internal Market. It shows that the 
operational principles of the Commission can be affected from within the institution. 
Therefore one can also claim that for the public interest to be realized, it is equally 
imperative that different DGs are involved when new legislation on Internet governance 
is drafted. 
 There is no logical reason behind not including DG Information Society in discussions 
about IPR enforcement. The proposals drafted by DG Internal Market indicate that there 
is a lack of understanding of both cultural and data privacy principles which are very 
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central in Internet usage. The Internet cannot be regulated by looking at economic 
factors alone, since, as has been mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, the Internet is both 
an infrastructure and a medium. This means that cultural notions cannot be ignored, to 
the extent that the Internet should be considered a public service rather than a source for 
private good. In the end, however, the future of Internet governance in Europe comes 
down to two factors: first, to what extent co- and self-regulation is endorsed by the 
Commission through various policy mechanisms, directives and international 
agreements, and second, to what extent the interests between industries converge. If 
there is a simultaneous increase in both self-regulatory measures and industry 
convergence there is a very real risk that the public interest in the EU might be 
increasingly about economic interest of a few powerful actors rather than the interest of 
the general population in the union. 
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Discussion 
In the introduction of this thesis it was mentioned that effective governance of the 
Internet within national borders is, to a large extent, impossible. As the Internet consists 
of billions of interconnected but separately working nodes, a centrally managed 
administrative authority with the aim of governing Internet content could only ever 
engage in a game of whack-a-mole, temporarily stopping leaks only to find out that 
three more have sprung up somewhere else. Similarly, nation states cannot guarantee 
the data protection of their citizens. For example, the majority of Norway’s Internet 
traffic goes through Sweden and is therefore monitored by the Swedish National 
Defence Radio Establishment (Försvarets Radioanstalt), which can hand over the 
information to a third party (Kullenberg, 2010, 35). National data protection is, in other 
words, impossible online. Due to the interconnected nature of the web it is only natural 
that the European Commission would seek to harmonize Internet legislation in the 
union.  
This study was initiated on the premises that the Commission, with its goal to 
harmonize the single market, is biased towards initiating economic rather than social 
policies. This argument is based on Martti Koskenniemi’s (2005; 2007), theory, 
according to which the choice of an international legal regime affects how decisions are 
made and how choices are weighed against each other. The choice of legal regime is 
affected by what an institution sees as its core mission. This means that the decisions an 
institution makes will always be predictable to a certain extent, it is, in other words, 
predisposed to favour certain solutions over others. This is what Koskenniemi calls 
structural bias. Koskenniemi’s theory serves as an excellent theoretical base for this 
study, but only on a conceptual level. When looking at how the Commission has drafted 
directives in the past, one can see that the directives’ aims and goals have been quite 
different. We can agree that the Commission makes Internet policy to advance 
economic interests, but this does not tell us whose economic interests are strengthened 
at what time period. These economic interests cannot be seen as opposed to the public 
interest, as these might converge at different time periods. Although it was rather 
ambitions to analyze five proposals for Directives and one international agreement 
(which was not ratified), I argue that a holistic approach was needed to properly assess 
how these interests have developed and been taken account by the Commission in 
different time periods. Analyzing only one or two proposals would have given an 
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incorrect picture of how the Commission has tried to shape Internet governance in 
Europe.  New directives and amendments are, of course, constantly being drafted, and 
how the Lisbon Treaty and abolishment of the pillar structure have affected the 
regulatory output of the Commission is yet to be determined. 
As the result of my analysis, I divided the regulatory efforts into three time periods of 
Internet governance: the age of ICT competitiveness, the age of data protection and the 
age of IPR enforcement. The first period, bearing with it the e-Commerce Directive, 
was marked by a fear of lagging behind. Silicon Valley was emerging as a highly 
lucrative business in the US, and the Europeans were simply not following. The 
repercussions are still felt today, as the dominant ICT sector companies are American: 
Google, the search engine giant and now also the largest producer of mobile operating 
systems, Microsoft, which still dominates desktop computer software, Facebook, with 
almost a billion users registered (and growing), and of course Apple, with a stock value 
of almost $600. In other words, American companies dominate both the software and 
the hardware markets. By harmonizing the single market, the Commission tried to 
stimulate cross-border trade within the EU. With a large enough market, more 
specialized businesses could ensue, and the investment risks would be lower. Similarly, 
the Commission tried to ensure telecoms and hosting service providers that although 
they provided the infrastructure, they need not be responsible for the online activities of 
companies and private individuals. Combining this with increased deregulation of the 
telecommunications sector, the Commission hoped that telecoms would aim to both 
provide faster Internet connections and expand the network – a strategy which seemed 
to have worked, since Internet penetration is quite high in Europe (about 73%).17  
The problem with the e-Commerce Directive was that it approached Internet users as 
consumers, not citizens. This is what urged DG Information Society to update the Data 
Protection Directive with the ePrivacy Directive, creating rules for how user 
information should be processed by both telecoms and hosting service providers. For 
ICT companies, the ePrivacy Directive was a nuisance which made business more 
difficult: Google and Facebook are still struggling with European data protection laws. 
                                                 
17 Akamai (2012), a cloud computing company, has published a report called The State of the Internet 
where they have listed connection speed by country, the top 100 cities with the fastest Internet 
connections, penetration of high broadband connections, broadband connections and narrowband 
connections.  
 90 
 
In relation to media governance, scholars have elevated that directives have to have 
industry backing to be approved. But since the ICT sector was underdeveloped in 
Europe, there were probably not that many ICT lobbyists involved in trying to influence 
the contents of the ePrivacy Directive. The companies that were affected most were 
American, and they might not have been that aware of the effects European Directives 
might have, or if they were and actually did try to lobby for changes, it might be that the 
European legislators were simply not that concerned, since it was more important to 
look out for European citizens than American companies.  
Be that as it may, the “internet piracy” wave in the beginning of the 21st century caught 
the music industry off-guard. Digital recordings and file-sharing technology made 
illegal dissemination of copyrighted content mainstream, and thirteen years later, illegal 
file-sharing is still a problem. This started the third age of internet governance, the age 
of IPR enforcement, which still presides today.  The Commission’s agenda has been to 
criminalize copyright infringing file-sharing, and despite resistance from both the 
Parliament and European citizens, the Commission has not updated its stance.  
Shortly after the first IPR enforcement Directive had been adopted, another issue was 
brought forth: Internet surveillance to protect national security. The terror attacks in 
London and Madrid created a window of opportunity for adopting legislation which 
allowed for privacy invading measures. It must be underlined, yet again, that the 
ensuing Data Retention Directive was a Council imitative. As such, it lies outside the 
outlined three ages of Internet governance that demonstrate how the Commission’s 
agenda has changed throughout the years. The Data Retention Directive shows, 
however, that nation states also have a say in Internet governance: the Directive proved 
that the Council was willing to put security interests before data protection. The 
Commission’s proposal also showed that co- and self-regulation was out of the 
question, but therein lies a paradox: Internet surveillance is dependent on telecoms 
cooperating with states. 
From a data protection point of view, one of the biggest dangers lies in regulatory 
instruments initiated for one cause become applicable in other policy sectors as well. If 
amendments in IPR enforcement legislation criminalize file-sharing and the Data 
Retention Directive would be updated to permit access to retained data for other reasons 
than combating serious crime, EU would effectively enter into an era of IPR 
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surveillance. In wording, the changes are seemingly minor; in effects, they are major. It 
has been stated elsewhere in this thesis that nation states are willing to compromise with 
rights and freedoms when it comes to matters of security – that is the inherent logic of 
all human rights instruments. Regardless of the privacy invading measures such 
instruments allow for, one can still, at least in theory, claim that the measures are 
implemented in the public interest. But if the same principles that have been justified by 
reference to security are used for enforcing copyright, it is the economic interest of 
rights holders and not the public interest of European citizens that is strengthened. Will 
there be enough political will to make these changes? It is unsure, but the technology 
and mechanisms for enforcing copyright effectively online are already there. 
One of the more important revelations of this thesis has been that the DG with the 
primary drafting responsibility matters an awful lot. Most legislation has been enacted 
by DG Internal Market and Services, while DG Information Society has been involved 
with the data protection legislation. Why DG Information Society has not been involved 
in all drafting processes is perplexing. Is it simply a question of who notices a problem 
first, as Dehousse (2003) would suggest, meaning that DG Internal Market has been 
quicker to react and therefore drafted the legislation? But would it not be preferable to 
include all competent parties, regardless of who took the initiative? The politics behind 
granting drafting responsibility to a certain DG is definitely a question which should be 
examined more closely.  
While the question of drafting responsibility is something which affects the policy and 
regulatory output from within the Commission, it would also be interesting to see how 
the private actors affected by Internet legislation are evolving and becoming more 
converged. For example, how is the increased horizontal integration affecting the 
diversity of interests? Telecoms are providing more and more streaming services; be it 
music, films or TV series. The development is natural: telecoms want more subscribers, 
and if they can integrate an increasing amount of services, they get a competitive 
advantage over other companies. At the same time, video streaming services require 
faster Internet connections which are also more expensive. In chapter 5 I elevated that 
the fate of Internet rights and freedoms from a citizen perspective are highly dependent 
on different private actors having divergent interests. In some questions it is natural for 
civil society to side with telecoms, in other ICT companies, and in some cases also with 
public service broadcasters. The Commission’s view of the public interest is clearly a 
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balancing act between industry interests, but as certain questions receive more attention 
at different time periods, the balance may be tipped in a particular party’s favour – and 
at this time, it is definitely the rights holders who have received the most attention. To 
delve into this question further it would be useful to study industry convergence 
throughout the union, and how these same actors try to lobby the Commission. One way 
of approaching this would be examining consultations and impact assessments 
conducted by the Commission. In the end, the future of Internet governance in Europe 
comes down to two factors: first, to what extent co- and self-regulation is endorsed by 
the Commission through various policy mechanisms, Directives and international 
agreements, and second, to what extent the interests between industries converge. If 
there is a simultaneous increase in both self-regulatory measures and industry 
convergence there is a very real risk that the public interest in the EU might be 
increasingly about economic interest of a few powerful actors rather than the interest of 
the general population of the union. 	
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